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The United States has long been a source of influence and 
inspiration to the developing federal system in the European 
Union.  As E.U. federalism matures, increasingly both systems may 
have the opportunity to profit from each other’s experience in 
federal regulatory theory and practice.  This article analyzes 
aspects of the federal ordering in each system, comparing both 
historical approaches and current developments.  It focuses on 
three legal topics, and the relationship between them:  (1) the 
federal regulation of matters of private law; (2) rules of the conflict 
of laws, which play a critical role in regulating cross-border 
litigation in an era of global communications, travel and trade; and 
(3) “subsidiarity,” which is a key constitutional principle in the 
European Union, and arguably also plays an implicit and under-
analyzed role in U.S. federalism.  The central contention of this 
Article is that the treatment of each of these areas of law is related 
—that they should be understood collectively as part of the range 
of competing regulatory strategies and techniques of each federal 
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system.  It is not suggested that “solutions” from one system can be 
simply transplanted to the other, but rather that the experiences of 
each federal order demonstrate the interconnectedness of 
regulation in these three subject areas, offering important insights 
from which each system might benefit. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It has long been recognized that the maturing federal system of 
the European Union1 has much to learn from what is commonly 
considered the oldest enduring federal system in the world—the 
United States.  As the European Union develops its own regulatory 
theories and practices, increasingly both systems may have the 
opportunity to profit from each other’s experience.  The fields of 
federal private law2 and conflict of laws,3 which have been areas of 
intensive and controversial regulatory and academic activity in the 
history of the development of E.U. and U.S. law, are particularly 
apposite subjects for comparative study.  The central contention of 
this Article is that the treatment of these two areas of law is related, 
and that this can be highlighted through analysis of a third, the 
principle of “subsidiarity,” which has a key constitutional role in 
the European Union, and a largely latent but potentially important 
role in the United States.  This Article thus explores the 
interrelation of subsidiarity, federal private law, and the conflict of 
laws, comparing approaches and developments in E.U. and U.S. 
federalism.4
 
1 For ease of reference, the institutions of European governance, present and 
past, will be referred to generally as the European Union, which is the term used 
for the reformed structure established in the Treaty of Lisbon Amending the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 
Dec. 17, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 (entered into force Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter 
Lisbon Treaty (2009)]. 
 
2 The distinction between public and private law, while long recognized as 
problematic in theory, still plays an important (if increasingly challenged) role in 
delimiting the sphere of operation of the conflict of laws.  See, e.g., William S. 
Dodge, The Public-Private Distinction in the Conflict of Laws, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 371, 372–94 (2008) (concluding that “[t]here is no good reason to maintain 
the public-private distinction in the conflict of laws”).  This Article does not adopt 
a definition of “private law,” but its focus is on developments in contract law and 
tort, where conflict of laws rules clearly apply. 
3 The term “conflict of laws” is sometimes (particularly in the United States) 
used narrowly to focus on choice of law rules, and sometimes (particularly in the 
European Union, where it is used interchangeably with “private international 
law”) considered to encompass rules on jurisdiction, choice of law, and the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  The focus in this Article is on 
questions of choice of law, although, particularly in the European Union, related 
developments in other areas of the conflict of laws (broadly conceived) will also 
be noted. 
4 In the European Union, references to ‘federalism’ are often associated with 
centralizing movements toward greater concentration of power in E.U. 
institutions.  By contrast, in the United States, references to ‘federalism’ are 
usually associated with decentralizing movements, which emphasize state rather 
than federal powers.  In this Article, references to ‘federalism’ are intended to be 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
MILLS.DOC 1/13/2011 6:46 PM 
372 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:2 
Any private dispute with an interstate or international cross-
border element5 raises potential conflict of laws issues, particularly 
concerning questions of jurisdiction and the determination of the 
applicable law.  In an era of globalization, it is thus a subject of 
intense and growing practical importance.  It has, however, too 
often and too easily been dismissed as a dry and technical aspect of 
civil procedure, whose days of academic interest are long past.  
Nothing could be further from the truth.  In the United States, 
there are clear signs of a reawakening of theoretical interest in 
conflict of laws through new interdisciplinary approaches.6  In the 
European Union the subject is in the midst of a full-blooded 
revolution, very different from but every bit as radical as the U.S. 
“conflict of laws revolution” of the mid-twentieth century.7
 
neutral on these questions—the term ‘federal’ is used merely to indicate a 
polycentric legal system with a vertical and horizontal division of powers 
between central and subsidiary authorities. 
  As 
will be examined further, the U.S. revolution overthrew not only 
traditional conflict of laws techniques, but also (at least partially) a 
long established “federal” perspective on choice of law when 
dealing with disputes internal to the United States.  By contrast, 
without a substantial change in traditional techniques, the conflict 
of laws in the European Union is losing its old identity as a 
technical part of “local” private or procedural law, and emerging 
5 In order to focus on federalism issues rather than questions of international 
law, this Article deals almost exclusively with intra-federal disputes—those with 
connections to more than one Member State of the European Union, or more than 
one state of the United States, but without international connecting factors. 
6 See generally KAREN KNOP ET AL., Foreword: Transdisciplinary Conflict of Laws, 
71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2008) (discussing various interdisciplinary 
approaches to analyzing private international law and the ways in which these 
approaches can revive and enrich conflict of laws scholarship).  See also Ralf 
Michaels, After the Revolution—Decline and Return of U.S. Conflict of Laws, 11 Y.B. 
PRIVATE INT’L L. 11, 13–15 (2009) (noting that the most interesting developments in 
conflict of laws are arising not from the traditional areas of contracts and torts, but 
from the intense debate over same-sex marriage, and arguing that an 
interdisciplinary approach to this subject will help lend clarity and depth to the 
discussion). 
7 See Ralf Michaels, The New European Choice-of-Law Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
1607 (2008) (arguing that the “federalization” and “constitutionalization” of E.U. 
choice of law rules has led to “a methodological pluralization” and a choice of law 
revolution in the European Union).  But see Symeon C. Symeonides, The American 
Revolution and the European Evolution in Choice of Law: Reciprocal Lessons, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 1741 (2008) (arguing that the changes in interpreting private international 
law in Europe constitute not a revolution, as occurred in the United States, but 
rather a quiet and steady evolution). 
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as a new foundational subject of European transnational or 
“federal” public law, helping to define the relationship between 
the legal orders of the Member States. 
These developments in the European Union and their contrast 
with the status of conflict of laws in the United States have begun 
to invite much deserved comparative attention.8
The federal treatment of private law in the European Union 
and the United States has undergone its own series of evolutions 
and revolutions.  In the United States, three key stages are explored 
in this Article
  This Article 
advances the analysis through greater consideration of a wider 
context, incorporating an examination of aspects of the structure 
and organization of both the E.U. and U.S. federal systems.  In 
exploring the origins of and justifications for these divergent 
approaches to the conflict of laws, this Article thus argues that they 
reflect broader themes and principles of federalism, which are also 
reflected in, and related to, the histories of private law regulation 
in each system. 
—
 
8 See generally George A. Bermann, Rome I: A Comparative View, in ROME I 
REGULATION: THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS IN EUROPE 349, 
350–56 (Franco Ferrari & Stefan Leible eds., 2009) (arguing that the set of rules 
presented in the Rome I Regulation are satisfactory for Europe, and comparing 
this success with the continued controversy over conflict of laws in the United 
States); Milena Sterio, The Globalization Era and the Conflict of Laws: What Europe 
Could Learn from the United States and Vice Versa, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
161 (2005) (positing that two American conflict of laws concepts—Brilmayer’s 
“political rights theory” and Guzman’s “economic law approach”—could 
potentially be utilized in both the United States and Europe, and may further the 
pursuit of universal choice of law solutions); Symposium, The New European 
Choice-of-Law Revolution: Lessons for the United States?, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1607 (2008) 
(including contributions by Ralf Michaels, Patrick J. Borchers, Jan von Hein, 
Dennis Solomon, Symeon C. Symeonides, Larry Cata Backer, Jens Dammann, 
Onnig H. Dombalagian, Katharina Boele-Woelki, Horatia Muir Watt, Linda J. 
Silberman, Richard Fentiman, William A. Reppy Jr., Jurgen Basedow, and Erin 
Ann O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein (jointly)) (examining the E.U. and U.S. conflict of 
laws experiences); Holger Spamann, Choice of Law in a Federal System and an 
Internal Market (N.Y.U. Law School Jean Monnet Ctr. for Int’l & Reg’l Econ. Law & 
Justice, Working Paper No. 8/01, 2001), http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet 
/papers/01/012601.html (comparing the constitutional requirements for choice of 
law in the United States and the European Union). 
the broad evolution of general federal common law 
under Swift v. Tyson, its revolutionary rejection under Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins, and the subsequent fragmentary development of 
modern federal common law under Clearfield Trust Co. v. United 
States.  In the European Union, a comparable evolutionary and 
fragmented development of European private law is identified and 
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examined, as well as, more recently, a contested movement toward 
the revolutionary adoption of general private law at the European 
level through a proposed “European civil code.” 
This Article argues that “subsidiarity,” a key legal principle in 
the constitutional distribution of power in the European Union and 
(it is argued) also implicitly in the United States, is the key to 
unlocking the explanation for these at times shared and at other 
times contrasting approaches, and the relationship between the 
federal treatment of private law and the conflict of laws in each 
system.  Whether conflict of laws rules should be the subject of 
centralized or subsidiary state regulation has long been and 
continues to be a matter of contention in the United States.  By 
contrast, the European Union has decisively reconceptualized the 
conflict of laws as a federal public law technique for promoting 
subsidiarity by ordering the diverse private law systems of the E.U. 
Member States—a role that a federalized conflict of laws might 
equally play in the United States. 
The concept of subsidiarity, which is introduced in Section 2, 
thus provides the lens through which this Article analyzes the 
relationship between private law and the conflict of laws.  Sections 
3 and 4 look at the approaches of the European Union and United 
States (respectively) toward federal private law and choice of law, 
comparing and contrasting their different perspectives and their 
relationship, present and historical, with ideas of subsidiarity in 
each federal order.  The analysis of the distinct traditions of private 
law and the conflict of laws in the European Union and United 
States reveals both commonalities and contrasts, which provides 
important insights into the theory, policy choices, and regulatory 
techniques of each federal system. 
2. DEFINING AND DISTINGUISHING SUBSIDIARITY 
Before examining its role in the fields of E.U. and U.S. private 
law and the conflict of laws, it is necessary to clarify the meaning 
of the term “subsidiarity,” particularly in the context of a federal 
system.  Although its roots may arguably be traced deeper to 
Aquinas and Aristotle, it is often said that the idea of subsidiarity 
has its origins in late nineteenth century Catholic social thought.9
 
9 See ANTONIO ESTELLA, THE EU PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND ITS CRITIQUE 
76–79 (2002) (emphasizing that the multi-faceted nature of “subsidiarity” is 
largely due to the various perspectives on which it was based, including the social 
doctrines of the Catholic Church); Nicholas Aroney, Subsidiarity, Federalism and the 
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One of its most prominent articulations was in a papal encyclical 
from 1931, which, as part of a broader critique of both unrestrained 
capitalism and totalitarian communism, stated that “it is an 
injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right 
order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and 
subordinate organizations can do.”10  The adoption of the principle 
of subsidiarity as part of the reconstruction of a German federal 
Constitution11
 
Best Constitution: Thomas Aquinas on City, Province and Empire, 26 LAW & 
PHILOSOPHY 161, 163 (2007) (noting that an inquiry into Thomas Aquinas’ 
understanding of community and political systems can help illuminate the 
concept of subsidiarity as a “Catholic social teaching . . . within the context of a 
wider social theory”); N.W. Barber, The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity, 11 EUR. L.J. 
308, 309–10 (2005) (acknowledging the possibility of a historical connection 
between the Catholic and European conceptions of subsidiarity, but arguing that 
there are major differences between them); Andrew Beale & Roger Geary, 
Subsidiarity Comes of Age?, 144 NEW L.J. 12 (1994) (arguing that St. Thomas 
Aquinas’ fusion of Catholic teaching with Aristotle’s notion of subsidiarity 
“automatically legitimised the state as part of God’s design”); Paolo G. Carozza, 
Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 38, 41 (2003) (stating that Catholic social theorists in the late nineteenth 
century developed the principle of subsidiarity as a “middle way between the 
perceived excesses of both laissez-faire liberal capitalist society and Marxian 
socialist alternatives”); Christoph Henkel, The Allocation of Powers in the European 
Union: A Closer Look at the Principle of Subsidiarity, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 359, 363–
64 (2002) (noting that the concept of subsidiarity is “rooted in the Catholic 
doctrine of social philosophy and the Catholic teachings on social reconstruction” 
under which, as first articulated by Pope Leo XIII, “’[i]t is not right . . . for either 
the citizen or the family to be absorbed by the State . . . .’”); Paul D. Marquardt, 
Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 616, 618 
(1994) (tracing the roots of “subsidiarity” to Catholic social theory and its first 
explicit description by Pope Pius XI); Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle 
of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103, 103–107 (2001) (contending 
that the modern American conception of “subsidiarity” and its automatic 
association with conservative viewpoints sharply contrasts with its origins in 
Catholic social theory and detracts from its influence on concepts of American 
federalism).  
 after the Second World War thus reflects in part the 
10 Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno: Encyclical Letter on Reconstruction of the Social 
Order, para. 79 (May 15, 1931), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father 
/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en 
.html.  
11 See GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, [GG] [Basic Law 
for the Federal Republic of Germany] [Federal Law Gazette Part III, 100-1] [as last 
amended by the Act of July 29, 2009], art. 23, available at 
http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/documents/legal/index.html (“With a 
view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall 
participate in the development of the European Union that is committed . . . to the 
principle of subsidiarity . . .”); see also id., art. 72(2). 
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fact that it also offered a direct critique of the fascist unitary 
conception of the state. 
The endurance of subsidiarity as an idea is matched by—and is 
perhaps a product of—its versatility.  In recent years it has been 
increasingly invoked to deal with a range of multi-layered 
governance problems, particularly in support of arguments for 
devolution toward greater local government.  A role for 
subsidiarity has also been proposed with respect to the 
international legal system as a whole; it has been argued that 
“[s]ubsidiarity is in the process of replacing the unhelpful concept 
of ‘sovereignty’ as the core idea that serves to demarcate the 
respective spheres of the national and international.”12
[u]nder the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not 
fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either 
at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, 
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved at Union level.
  
Subsidiarity remains most famous in modern usage as a legal 
principle of European Union law.  In that context, the Treaty on 
European Union provides that: 
13
 
12  Mattias Kumm, Democratic Constitutionalism Encounters International Law: 
Terms of Engagement, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 256, 264 (Sujit 
Choudhry ed., 2006); see also ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERING OF PRIVATE LAW 103–06 (2009) (discussing how 
subsidiarity is a helpful way to approach the question of the distribution of 
lawmaking authority between individual states and multi-state bodies); Carozza, 
supra note 9, at 40 (stating that “subsidiarity can be understood to be a conceptual 
alternative to the comparatively empty and unhelpful idea of state sovereignty”); 
Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of 
Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2004).  See generally THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF 
AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND 
SUBSIDIARITY (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008) (providing an excellent 
overview of the of the principle of subsidiarity); JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, 
THE WTO, AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (2006) 
(discussing the allocation of power under principles of subsidiarity). 
 
13 Treaty on European Union, art. 5(3), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 13, 18 
[hereinafter Treaty on European Union].  All references in this Article are to this 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, and to the Consolidated 
version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 
2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, formerly the “Treaty Establishing the European Community,” 
both of which incorporate the changes made by the Lisbon Treaty (2009).  The 
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The justifications offered for this principle typically draw on ideas 
of autonomy, accountability, organizational effectiveness, and local 
diversity in preferences and identity, which, it is argued, are 
generally better served by rules made by a subsidiary authority.14  
It is sometimes expressed as the idea that decisions should be 
“taken . . . as closely as possible to the citizen,”15
In a federal system, subsidiarity means that regulation should 
be carried out by the states, unless there is a justification for action 
to be taken at the federal level.
 and more 
specifically, to those people who will be affected by a decision, 
suggesting that it also has links with ideas of democratic 
participation. 
16  Defined in this way, a key feature 
of the concept is that it reflects an attempt to balance centrifugal 
and centripetal forces in a federal order—it may be offered both as 
a presumption against federal law, but also as a justification for 
centralized regulation.  It thus “demarcates a conceptual territory 
in which unity and plurality interact, pull at one another, and seek 
reconciliation.”17
 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union will be referred to collectively as the “E.U. Treaties.” 
  A foundational problem in any federal system is 
the question of the distribution of the authority to regulate, which 
may thus be redescribed as the question of what theory of 
subsidiarity should be adopted.   
14 See, e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the 
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 340 (1994) 
(discussing the benefits of subsidiarity, such as the resulting increases in self-
determination and the participatory power of individuals and local communities); 
Kumm, Democratic Constitutionalism Encounters International Law, supra note 12, at 
265 (arguing that the principle of subsidiarity offers “sensibility towards locally 
variant preferences, possibilities for meaningful participation and accountability, 
and the protection and enhancement of local identities”).  
15 Treaty on European Union, supra note 13, art. 1. 
16 Subsidiarity may also support arguments for devolution within subsidiary 
authorities, on the basis that “there are few functions for which a mid-sized actor 
is most efficient” (or democratically effective).  Marquardt, supra note 9, at 637; see 
also Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in an 
Age of Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 510 (2010) 
(contending that “subsidiarity is better fit for the task of articulating multilevel 
governance, even if only as a tool for loosening the grip of federalism over our 
political and legal theory”).  There is some recognition of this in the reference to 
regulation “at regional and local level” in the definition of subsidiarity in the 
Treaty on European Union, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty (2009).  See Treaty 
on European Union, supra note 13, art. 5(3) and infra note 67. 
17 Carozza, supra note 9, at 52.  
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2.1. Subsidiarity in Constitutional Settlement and Practice 
In both the European Union and the United States, two 
methods of allocating regulatory authority (i.e., two ways in which 
ideas of subsidiarity can be given effect) may be distinguished:  an 
exclusive allocation of powers as a matter of constitutional 
settlement, and a more dynamic allocation of shared or non-
exclusive powers as a matter of constitutional practice. 
2.1.1. Constitutional Settlement 
The first method concerns the allocation of powers by either the 
E.U. Treaties or the U.S. Constitution.  Under any federal 
constitution, exclusive competence (legal power) over a particular 
field might be allocated either to the federal level or to the states.  
An allocation to federal or state levels might be done specifically, 
by a grant of a particular exclusive constitutional power,18
 
18 The exclusive powers of E.U. institutions have been a matter of dispute.  
See, e.g., Opinion 1/75, Re: Understanding on a Local Cost Standard, 1975 E.C.R. 
1355 (holding that the Community power in question was exclusive, because to 
conclude otherwise would “distort the institutional framework, call into question 
the mutual trust within the Community and prevent the latter from fulfilling its 
task in the defence of the common interest.”); Alan Dashwood, The Relationship 
Between the Member States and the European Union/European Community, 41 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 355, 369–73 (2004) (arguing that a limited exclusive power 
vested in the Union is one of the key characteristics defining the relationship 
between Member States and the Union); see also Theodor Schilling, A New 
Dimension of Subsidiarity: Subsidiarity as a Rule and a Principle, 14 Y.B. EUR. L. 203 
(1994) (arguing that subsidiarity should affect the determination of exclusive E.U. 
powers).  The Lisbon Treaty (2009) has attempted to clarify this issue in its 
reforms to the E.U. Treaties.  See Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, supra note 13, arts. 2–4 (granting exclusive competence to the Union in 
specific areas and providing that a Member State may “legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts” in those areas “only if  so  empowered  by  the  Union  or  for  the  
implementation  of  Union  acts”).  The allocation of powers in Article I, Section 8 
of the Constitution of the United States is generally non-exclusive except where 
made exclusive through the operation of Article I, Section 10, which prohibits the 
exercise of certain powers by U.S. states, or where such exclusivity is necessarily 
implied by the nature of the power.  See, e.g., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819) (“Whenever the terms in which a power is granted to 
congress, or the nature of the power, require that it should be exercised 
exclusively by congress, the subject is as completely taken from the state 
legislatures, as if they had been expressly forbidden to act on it.”). 
 or 
generally, as part of an allocation of residual powers which are not 
specifically dealt with in the Constitution.  Thus, where the Tenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
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prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people,”19 it is, possibly among other 
things,20 allocating exclusive competence to the States in respect of 
those powers not granted to the federal government by the 
Constitution.  It is implicitly making a determination, or perhaps 
reaffirming an existing understanding,21 that, in respect of those 
powers, federal regulation is unnecessary.  The legal consequence 
of this determination is that the federal government cannot use its 
other powers to achieve regulation indirectly in areas that fall 
outside its competence; it reinforces the limited nature of federal 
authority.22
 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
  Similarly, the European Union’s principle of 
‘conferral’ provides that “the Union shall act only within the limits 
of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the 
Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein,” and 
20 See DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE “SILENT” NINTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE 
(2007); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1440 
(1987) (arguing that the original purpose of the Tenth Amendment was not to 
allocate power between governments, but to make clear that “the People retained 
all powers not expressly or impliedly delegated by enumeration—powers they 
could either give to other government agents in individual states, or withhold 
from all governments.”); Seth M. Rokosky, Comment, Denied and Disparaged: 
Applying the “Federalist” Ninth Amendment, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 275 (2010) (discussing 
the debate over whether the Ninth Amendment is meant to protect individual 
liberties or state powers, and applying the argument for protecting state powers 
to the Tenth Amendment); see also KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH 
AMENDMENT (2009) (advancing the argument summarized by Rokosky that the 
Ninth Amendment is a protection of state powers); Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth 
Amendment: It Means What it Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2006) (concluding that the 
Ninth Amendment protects individual liberties—the other half of the debate 
summarized by Rokosky). 
21  See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (“There is nothing 
in the history of [the Tenth Amendment’s] adoption to suggest that it was more 
than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments 
as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment . . . .”); see 
also United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 (1931) (“The Tenth Amendment 
was intended to confirm the understanding of the people at the time the 
Constitution was adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were 
reserved to the states or to the people.”). 
22 See generally Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (holding that the Driver’s 
Privacy Protection Act—regulating state disclosure of personal information—did 
not violate the Tenth Amendment).  See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
935 (1997) (holding that “Congress cannot circumvent th[e] prohibition 
[announced in New York v. United States] by conscripting the State’s officers 
directly”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that, under 
the Tenth Amendment, “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to 
enact or administer a federal regulatory program”). 
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“[c]ompetences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties 
remain with the Member States.”23
Whether it is specific or general, a grant of power in the 
foundational document of the federal system itself determines the 
appropriateness of regulation at the relevant level.  An exclusive 
allocation of competence to the federal level implicitly involves a 
determination that uniform regulation at that level is strongly 
necessary and justified.  An exclusive allocation to the states 
implicitly involves a determination that regulation at the federal 
level is not necessary and cannot be justified.  In each case, the 
Treaty or Constitution reflects and embodies a determination that 
might be characterized as the result of a subsidiarity analysis.  In 
this context, the subsidiarity analysis is conducted as part of the 
negotiation (and judicial interpretation) of the terms of the 
Constitution; it is “hard-wired” as part of the constitutional 
settlement of the federal system.  Thus, for example, the Supreme 
Court stated in Gregory v. Ashcroft
 
24
[A]ssures a decentralized government that will be more 
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it 
increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic 
processes; it allows for more innovation and 
experimentation in government; and it makes government 
 that giving effect to the Tenth 
Amendment: 
 
23 Treaty on European Union, supra note 13, art. 5(2).  This clause is 
somewhat in tension with Article 352(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, which provides that “[i]f action by the Union should prove 
necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain 
one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the 
necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall 
adopt the appropriate measures.”  Id.; see also Opinion 2/94, Accession by the 
Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 1996 E.C.R. I-1759, I-1761 (noting that “the competence of 
the Community to enter into international commitments may not only flow from 
express provisions of the Treaty but also be implied from those provisions”); Case 
8/73, Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey-Ferguson GmbH 1973 E.C.R. 897, 901 
(discussing the applicability of Article 235 and stating that it does not create a 
discretionary power but authorizes power to fill in gaps in a treaty); J.H.H. Weiler, 
The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2443–44 (1991) (pointing to Article 
235 of the EEC Treaty—the predecessor to Article 352—as the key to the ECJ’s 
expansion of the implied powers doctrine). 
24 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding that the federal Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act does not preempt state law requiring 
mandatory retirement of appointed state judges at age 70).  
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more responsive by putting the States in competition for a 
mobile citizenry.25
These are criteria readily recognizable as justifications for 
subsidiarity—a principle that is, in this context, implicitly 
embodied within the constitutional division of powers. 
  
2.1.2. Constitutional Practice 
The second way in which subsidiarity may be operative 
concerns powers that are not exclusively assigned either to the 
federal or state level, but shared.  The supremacy of federal over 
state law when there is any inconsistency between them is clearly 
established in both the European Union26 and United States;27
 
25 Id. at 458. 
 thus, 
there is no question of a dispute over the priority between actually 
26 See, e.g., Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. 
Simmenthal SpA, 1978 E.C.R. 629 (requiring national courts to “set aside any 
provision of national law which may conflict with [Community law], whether 
prior or subsequent to the Community rule”); see also Case 11/70, Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125 (“[T]he validity of a Community measure or its 
effect within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter 
to either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that State or the 
principles of its constitutional structure.”); Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 
1964 E.C.R. 585 (“[T]he EEC treaty has created its own legal system which, on the 
entry into force of the treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the 
Member States and which their courts are bound to apply.”); Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, supra note 13, art. 2(2), at 50 (“Member states 
shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its 
competences.”).  But see Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, arts. 
4(3) & 4(4) (providing that, in the areas of research, technological development, 
space, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid, exercise of Union 
competence “shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising 
theirs.”).  
27 This is provided for by the Supremacy Clause, which states:  
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.   
U.S. CONST. art. VI.  The meaning of the Supremacy Clause has been defined—and 
clarified—by the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 406, 411–12 (1819) (noting that federal law is supreme and clarifying 
that, in addition to its enumerated powers, Congress may pass any laws which it 
deems “necessary and proper”); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 
149 (1819) (“[T]he mere grant of a power to congress, does not vest it exclusively 
in that body” if congress chooses not to act, but “the laws of the United States, 
which shall be made, shall be the supreme law of the land . . . .”) (emphasis added).   
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inconsistent federal and state laws.  There is, however, wide scope 
for disagreement over putative federal laws—the question of 
whether federal regulation should be adopted.  For such shared 
powers, the subsidiarity question is “unresolved,” or left open, as a 
matter of constitutional settlement.  Whether through a legal rule 
or political negotiation (or a combination of the two) in these areas, 
which fall between powers allocated exclusively to the states or to 
the federal government, the level of regulation must be “justified.”  
In the legal and political space of these “shared powers,” the 
principle of subsidiarity can play a different role, as a central and 
dynamic aspect of the negotiations between the different levels of 
federal governance—part of the constitutional practice of such 
“justifications.”  Subsidiarity arguments are thus implicitly at the 
heart of discussions over whether federal uniformity is really 
necessary to displace different state approaches in a particular 
field, or over which level of government is best placed to ensure 
implementation of policy objectives. 
The focus in this Article is on subsidiarity as a legal rather than 
political doctrine.  The extent to which a federal system chooses to 
“legalize” the debate over subsidiarity questions affects not only 
the vocabulary of the debate (to what extent it is a legal question or 
a question of policy), but also the power of the actors (whether 
evaluating the requirements of subsidiarity is a judicial or 
parliamentary function) and their approach (to what extent it is a 
technical question drawing on principle and precedent and to what 
extent it is an open contest of values). 
Critics of subsidiarity in the European Union have sometimes 
suggested that it is an empty concept, that it offers no guidance for 
particular decisions and thus can act as a justification for action (or 
inaction) at any level.28
 
28 See, e.g., ESTELLA, supra note 9, at 6 (suggesting that “subsidiarity is, from a 
functional perspective, devoid of clear legal content”); Virginia Harrison, 
Subsidiarity in Article 3b of the EC Treaty—Gobbledegook or Justiciable Principle?, 45 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 431 (1996) (suggesting that while it may be difficult to clearly 
define subsidiarity, it is still justiciable); John Peterson, Subsidiarity: A Definition to 
Suit Any Vision?, 47 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 116 (1994) (“Subsidiarity is a complex 
idea which can be (and has been) abused and molded to suit virtually any 
prohibited agenda.”); Marquardt, supra note 9, at 628–29 (discussing arguments 
that subsidiarity can be used to justify any given position). 
  This misses the point of a dynamic and in 
many ways intensely practical principle which in this context is 
designed to shape the framework and process of allocation of 
shared regulatory competence in a very fact-specific way, rather 
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than (as the E.U. Treaties themselves do) “hard-wire” specific pre-
determined decisions on lawmaking power.29
The principle of subsidiarity does not call into question the 
powers conferred on the European Community by the 
Treaty . . . [but rather, in] areas for which the Community 
does not have exclusive competence . . . [it] provides a 
guide as to how those powers are to be exercised at the 
Community level.  Subsidiarity is a dynamic concept and 
should be applied in the light of the objectives set out in the 
Treaty.  It allows Community action within the limits of its 
powers to be expanded where circumstances so require, 
and conversely, to be restricted or discontinued where it is 
no longer justified.
  Thus, according to 
the E.U. Protocol on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality (as adopted in 1997): 
30
While subsidiarity is importantly adopted here as a legal principle, 
the political dimension of a subsidiarity analysis, even where 
conducted by the courts, is also ever present in the judgment as to 
whether regulatory action is really “necessary” or “justified”—
“one’s judgment about whether a measure comports with the 
principle of subsidiarity is a profoundly political one, in the sense 
that it depends intimately on one’s assessment of the measure’s 
merits.”
 
31  The scope for political contestation is also expanded by 
the counter-factual nature of a subsidiarity inquiry.  The question 
of whether the objectives of a regulation could be achieved through 
measures adopted at a lower level may be assisted by practical 
experience,32
 
29 See, e.g., Kumm, Democratic Constitutionalism Encounters International Law, 
supra note 12, at 265 (arguing that the usefulness of subsidiarity “does not lie in 
providing a definitive answer in any specific context.  But it structures inquiries in 
a way that is likely to be sensitive to the relevant empirical and normative 
concerns”); Akos G. Toth, Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?, 19 EUR. L. REV. 268 (1994) 
(discussing the ways in which subsidiarity is justiciable and the limits on judicial 
determinations with respect to subsidiarity).  
 but will rarely be determined by it.  Subsidiarity has 
30 Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality, para. 3, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 105.  The current version 
of this protocol, substantially amended by the Lisbon Treaty (2009), is attached as 
protocol no. 2 to the Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 13, at 206. 
31 Bermann, supra note 14, at 335. 
32 See infra text accompanying notes 77 and 186. 
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thus fairly been described as “fully an exercise in speculation as 
well as judgment.”33
2.1.3. The Interaction of Constitutional Settlement and Practice 
 
The doctrine of subsidiarity may therefore be operative in a 
federal system in two ways:  first, as part of a fixed constitutional 
arrangement allocating exclusive competence in respect of certain 
powers to federal or state levels—a matter of constitutional 
settlement; and second, as part of a dynamic allocation of 
competence over shared powers—a matter of constitutional 
practice, which is (or may be) both legal and political in character.  
These roles of subsidiarity are complementary and may also be 
connected.  The more that a constitution “hard-wires” a 
subsidiarity determination by allocating powers exclusively to 
federal or state levels, the less scope and need there is for 
subsidiarity to operate as a matter of constitutional practice.  
Conversely, the more that subsidiarity is taken into consideration 
as a legal and political principle as a matter of constitutional 
practice, the less concern there is likely to be with the fact that the 
constitution leaves a subsidiarity determination “unsettled,” by 
sharing competence between federal and state levels.  Subsidiarity 
as a doctrine of legal theory and practice may thus be central to the 
design of federal constitutions, particularly in a system (like the 
European Union) where questions of constitutional settlement 
arise periodically for renegotiation. 
2.2. Proportionality and Constitutional Interpretation 
In any allocation of powers in a federal system, to either the 
federal or state level, exclusively or shared, a further issue arises.  
This is the question of the interpretation of the scope of the power, 
or the degree to which the allocation of power justifies regulation 
of areas indirectly affecting or affected by the field.  An allocation 
of power may be (to varying degrees) strictly defined or left with 
indeterminate boundaries which are then subject to legal and 
political contestation.  This contestation overlaps significantly with 
ideas of subsidiarity, particularly as they are implicated in the 
constitutional settlement of a federal system. 
For example, in the United States, the limits of powers 
allocated to the federal Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the 
 
33 Bermann, supra note 14, at 335. 
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Constitution,34 are affected by Clause 18 of that section, which 
provides (after delimiting the range of powers of Congress) that 
“[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”35
 This test of whether regulation is “necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution” one of the range of allocated powers 
requires a determination (in practice, by both political actors and 
the courts) of how closely related the measure is to the power.  This 
is not, however, a test of whether it is “necessary and proper” that 
the regulation take place at the federal level—a subsidiarity 
analysis.  Rather, it is a test of whether the regulation is “necessary 
and proper” to achieve the objectives of the allocation of power 
under the Constitution—an allocation which already implicitly 
contains a ‘hard-wired’ determination that the power is justified 
according to a subsidiarity analysis.  This form of analysis is 
therefore much more akin to the role of the principle of 
proportionality in the European Union, which imposes the 
requirement that “the content and form of Union action shall not 





34 For a discussion of Article I, Section 8, see supra note 18. 
 counter-balanced by the grant of any powers 
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 420 (1819) (holding that the clause “purport[s] to enlarge, not to 
diminish the powers vested in the Government.  It purports to be an additional 
power, not a restriction on those already granted.”). 
36 Treaty on European Union, supra note 13, art. 5(4).  See Bermann, supra note 
14, at 386–90 (noting that the concept of proportionality is commonly understood 
to include the requirement not only that the action in question be reasonably 
related to the objective, but also that it be the least burdensome alternative 
adequate to achieve the desired end while not carrying a cost greater than its 
benefit); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (holding that a 
federal regulation had to show “congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end” to be 
authorized under the Fourteenth Amendment); George A. Bermann, Subsidiarity 
and the European Community, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 97, 110–12 (1993) 
(pointing out that the decision whether to regulate at the federal or state level may 
be affected by concerns other than the vertical balance of power—a typical 
subsidiarity concern—such as the relationship between the regulation and the 
objective, the cost-benefit balance, and the burden posed by the regulation—
typical proportionality concerns); Henkel, supra note 9, at 374–78 (comparing the 
concepts of subsidiarity and proportionality and noting that while they “manifest 
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“necessary . . . to attain one of the objectives set out in the 
Treaties.”37  The broader process of reasoning inherent in such an 
analysis is one that is widely adopted at both national and 
international levels, when courts face problems of reconciling 
apparently conflicting norms or values.38
In the context of a federal system, the approach which is taken 
to the question of what is a “necessary and proper” regulation 
obviously affects the balance of regulatory powers between federal 
and state levels (i.e. the issue of subsidiarity as constitutional 
settlement). However, this does not overtly require the court to 
determine whether the specific federal legislation in question is 
justified in order to achieve objectives which could not be 
satisfactorily achieved by regulation at the state level (i.e. the issue 
of subsidiarity as constitutional practice).  If different judges take 
different views on the scope of federal powers under the 
Constitution of a federal system, the basis for these different views 
will not be articulated as an evaluation of whether specific federal 
measures are necessary (i.e. whether federal or state authorities are 
more suited to achieve the particular policy objectives of the 
measure), but of whether they are within the express or implied 
scope of the constitutionally allocated (and thus inherently 
justified) powers.  Although this is formally presented as a 
question of interpretation, it will, however, also clearly involve 
questions of political judgment as to the appropriate allocation of 
powers between federal and state levels. 
 
Where subsidiarity as constitutional settlement (including 
proportionality) and subsidiarity as constitutional practice do not 
match up, this is likely to be a source of constitutional conflict in 
one of two ways.  Regulatory action may be “necessarily” 
connected to a shared power (satisfying proportionality), but 
nevertheless “unnecessary” in light of the alternative courses of 
action (not satisfying subsidiarity)—this would likely lead to 
protestations by states that federal power is being improperly 
exercised.  Equally, federal regulation may achieve some objective 
 
distinct differences, their independent spheres of application buttress one 
another”). 
37 Treaty on European Union, supra note 13, art. 352(1); see also sources cited 
supra note 23.  
38 See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and 
Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72 (2008) (tracing the global 
development and adoption of proportionality analysis and its allowance for 
judicial review of conflicting legislative actions). 
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that cannot be otherwise achieved (satisfying subsidiarity), but that 
objective may not come sufficiently within the scope of any federal 
power (not satisfying proportionality)—this is likely to lead to 
protestations by federal authorities that they lack the powers 
necessary to perform their functions.39
Drawing a clear technical or functional distinction between 
constitutional doctrines with a political dimension, like 
subsidiarity and proportionality, is inevitably difficult.  
Subsidiarity as a principle of constitutional settlement helps 
determine the allocation of powers between federal and state 
levels.  Proportionality is one aspect of defining that allocation of 
powers—determining how closely connected regulatory acts need 
to be with a power to be validly supported by it.  Where it is 
determined that a regulatory act would fall within shared federal 
and state competence, the secondary issue of subsidiarity as a 
matter of constitutional practice arises, which is the question of 
whether a federal law is really necessary to achieve the objectives 
of the regulation. 
  In either case, this is likely 
to put pressure on the constitutional settlement—leading to 
proposals for constitutional reform. 
3. SUBSIDIARITY, PRIVATE LAW, AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
As the European Union has grown out of independent states, 
its development as a legal system has naturally involved the 
emergence and expansion of “federal” European law.  This 
impetus toward centralization is reflected in the constitutional 
exhortation to create “an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe.”40  It is well known that much of the progress toward 
centralization of regulation has been driven by the European Court 
of Justice, which has, particularly through the doctrines of 
“supremacy”41 and ”direct effect”42
 
39 In the European Union, a problematic device allowing for the flexible 
expansion of powers in these circumstances is provided by Article 352 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  See sources cited supra note 23. 
 of E.U. law, pushed the 
40 Treaty on European Union, supra note 13, pmbl. and art. 1.  This statement 
was originally adopted in the Preamble of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.   
41 See sources cited supra note 26 (discussing the recognition of the supremacy 
of federal law in the European Union). 
42 See, e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1 (holding that Article 12 of the Treaty Establishing the 
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transformation of the European Union from a regional 
organization to a quasi-federal system.  The focus of this section is 
on the less widely appreciated development of federal private law 
and the conflict of laws as part of this evolving order. 
3.1. Private Law and the Emergence of Subsidiarity 
3.1.1. Toward European Private Law? 
The primary focus of early European integration was on 
questions of public law, particularly economic regulation, and this 
was and remains reflected in the absence of any general European 
competence over questions of private law.  This lack of competence 
reflects an implicit ‘hard-wired’ subsidiarity determination—the 
Member States have determined that, at least in general, 
centralized private law regulation is unnecessary for the purposes 
of the federal union.  In the field of private law, the ‘progress’ 
toward European harmonization has therefore been limited, 
incremental, and somewhat fragmented, partly through the 
development of law by the European Court of Justice,43 but 
primarily through Regulations and Directives based on particular 
powers.44
 
European Community produces direct effects and creates individual rights that 
must be recognized and protected by national courts). 
  The scope of these rules is limited by the powers 
43 See generally Walter van Gerven, European Court of Justice Case Law as a 
Means of Unification of Private Law?, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 680-81 (1997) (arguing 
that ECJ case law tends to harmonize, rather than unify, national private laws); 
Koen Lenaerts & Kathleen Gutman, “Federal Common Law” in the European Union: 
A Comparative Perspective from the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2006) 
(contrasting the rise of “federal common law” in the ECJ with its decline in U.S. 
jurisprudence). 
44 See generally CHRISTIAN TWIGG-FLESNER, THE EUROPEANISATION OF CONTRACT 
LAW (2008) (summarizing the history of European contract law and the notable 
predominance of Directives in its development); Jürgen Basedow, EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE LAW: SOURCES; Jürgen Basedow, Federal Choice of Law in Europe and the 
United States—A Comparative Account of Interstate Conflicts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2119, 
2124 (2008) (noting that although the number of legislative acts regulating 
contracts, corporations, intellectual property, and other legal issues has increased 
over the past fifteen years, European private law legislation continues to be 
fragmentary); Walter van Gerven, Harmonization of Private Law: Do we Need it?, 41 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 505, 507-14 (2004); Reiner Schulze, European Private Law and 
Existing EC Law, 13 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 3 (2005) (examining the possible effects of 
the European Commission’s Action Plan to replace current Regulations and 
Directives with Europe-wide contract laws); Reinhard Zimmermann, The Present 
State of European Private Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 479 (2009) (evaluating the state of 
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granted under the E.U. Treaties.  For example, a range of Directives 
affecting private law has been issued under the treaty provision 
granting European institutions competence over consumer 
protection,45 which complements the more general competence to 
“adopt . . . measures for the approximation of the provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market.”46
 The harmonization of private law has been further limited by 
the fact that, although E.U. treaty provisions themselves and 
Regulations made under them are capable of having both vertical 
 
 
European private law and the development of principles and Directives in 
contract law). 
45 See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 13, art. 
169 (authorizing certain measures “to  promote  the  interests  of  consumers  and  
to  ensure  a  high  level  of  consumer protection”).  A proposal to simplify this 
range of Directives is under consideration.  Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights, COM (2008) 614 final (Oct. 8, 
2008) (proposing to replace the fragmented Consumer Acquis with a single 
Directive on consumer protection); see also Albertina Albors-Llorens, Consumer 
Law, Competition Law and the Europeanization of Private Law, in THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 245, 266–70 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2006) 
(arguing that the consumer interest in competition law and the adoption of 
consumer protection Directives to promote market integration jointly influence 
European private law); Martijn W. Hesselink, European Contract Law: A Matter of 
Consumer Protection, Citizenship, or Justice?, 15 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 323, 347 (2007) 
(arguing that “European contract law does not address us as persons who should 
be treated with justice nor as citizens who have fundamental rights, but, most of 
the time, as consumers”); Simon Whittaker, A Framework of Principle for European 
Contract Law?, 125 LAW Q. REV. 616 (2009) (tracing the development of the 
“Common Frame of Reference” and its effectiveness in identifying common 
principles for European contract and consumer law); Zimmermann, supra note 44, 
at 486–90 (discussing the E.U.’s 2008 Proposal for a Directive on Consumers).  See 
also infra text accompanying note 80 (highlighting proposals for a European 
contract law). 
46 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 13, art. 114.  
See Case C-436/03, Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. I-3733 (holding that the 
Community is empowered to adopt measures which contribute to the elimination 
of obstacles to the economic freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty); Case C-491/01, 
The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Health ex parte British Am. Tobacco (Investments) 
Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-11453 (holding that the Community had the power to adopt a 
Directive regarding the manufacture, presentation, and sale of cigarettes because 
the aim of the Directive was to prevent “the emergence of future obstacles to trade 
resulting from multifarious development of national laws”); Case C-380/03, 
Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2006 E.C.R. I-11573 (upholding the validity 
of a Directive which prohibits press and radio advertisements for tobacco 
products on the basis that the Directive reduces disparities in national laws on 
advertising of tobacco products which would otherwise impede the free 
movement of goods and the freedom to provide services). 
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and horizontal “direct effect”47 (which can give rise to private law 
remedies),48 in many cases the E.U. Treaties only authorize the 
adoption of a Directive, a weaker regulatory instrument.  A 
Directive is binding on state public authorities (vertical direct 
effect),49 but, unless it has been implemented by national law, not 
on private parties.  It thus has only indirect horizontal effect on 
private law, through, for example, influencing the development 
and interpretation of national law.50  These limitations have been 
addressed to some extent through doctrines of “incidental effect,”51
 
47 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 13, art. 288.  
See also Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne 
Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455 (noting that Article 119 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community regarding equal pay has direct effect); Case 
6/64, Costa v. ENEL (Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica), 1964 E.C.R. 585 (noting 
that a legal duty not to act can produce a direct effect); Case 26/62, Van Gend en 
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1 (holding that 
Article 12 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, which 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality, has direct effect). 
 
48 See, e.g., Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan, 2001 E.C.R. I-6297 
(finding a party to a contract liable to restrict or distort competition may rely on 
breach of Art. 81 EC to obtain relief); Case C-253/00, Muñoz & Superior Fruiticola 
v. Frumar Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-7289 (finding Community provisions on quality 
standards applicable to fruits or vegetables capable of enforcement through civil 
proceedings); Gerrit Betlem, Torts, A European Ius Commune and the Private 
Enforcement of Community Law, 64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 126 (2005) (discussing the role of 
civil actions in enforcing Community law); Assimakis P. Komninos, New Prospects 
for Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law: Courage v. Crehan and the 
Community Right to Damages, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 447, 449 (2002) (arguing 
that Courage v. Crehan established “a Community-law based right in damages”). 
49 See, e.g., Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton & Sw. Hampshire Area 
Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 723 (holding that a Directive prohibiting sex 
discrimination in the workplace does not impose obligations directly on private 
employers, but does obligate Member States acting as employers). 
50 See, e.g., Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de 
Alimentación SA, 1990 E.C.R. 4135 (holding that “in applying national law, 
whether the provisions in question were adopted before or after the Directive, the 
national court called upon to interpret it is required to do so, as far as possible, in 
the light of the wording and the purpose of the Directive”); Joined Cases C-397/01 
to C-403/01, Pfeiffer v. Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV, 2004 
E.C.R. I-8835 (applying the principle that national courts must interpret national 
rules consistently with the objectives of a Community Directive); Case 14/83, Von 
Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984 E.C.R. 1891 (holding that Member 
States “are required to adopt measures which are sufficiently effective to achieve 
the objectives of the Directive and to ensure that those measures may in fact be 
relied on before national courts by the persons concerned.”). 
51 See, e.g., Case C-194/94, CIA Sec. Int’l SA v. Signalson SA, 1996 E.C.R. I-
2201 (holding that breach of the procedural obligation to notify a technical 
regulation to the Commission, as set out in a Directive, results in the 
unenforceability of the technical regulation in private proceedings before national 
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and of state liability for the breach of, or the failure to implement, 
E.U. law.52  Community values, such as those set out in the 
European Convention on Human Rights, may also have an indirect 
role in developing private law rules in the different Member States.  
The Treaty on European Union establishes that “[f]undamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s 
law.”53
 
courts); Case C-159/00, Sapod Audic v. Eco-Emballages SA, 2002 E.C.R. I-5031 
(holding that a “substantial procedural defect such as to render the technical 
regulations in question inapplicable” may be relied on between private parties); 
Case C-443/98, Unilever Italia SpA v. Cent. Food SpA, 2000 E.C.R. I-7535 (holding 
that although an individual may not rely on or be obligated by a Community 
Directive, individuals may rely on the inapplicability of a national technical 
standard when it is not in compliance with the Directive). 
  Both the ECJ and also the courts of the Member States are 
52 See, e.g., Joined Cases C-48/93 & C-46/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. 
Germany and The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame Ltd., 
1996 E.C.R. I-1029 (applying the principle of state liability for loss and damage 
caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law to a breach of 
Community law attributable to the legislature); Joined Cases C-6/90 & 9/90, 
Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. I-5357 (holding that “the principle 
whereby a State must be liable for loss or damage caused to individuals as a result 
of breaches of Community law for which the State can be held responsible is 
inherent in the system of the Treaty.”).  The development of state liability 
principles has sometimes been characterized as a form of European private law, 
creating a private right to damages somewhat analogous to tort law.  Similar 
claims have been made with respect to the law developed to govern non-
contractual liability of the European Community for “damage caused by its 
institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.”  Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, supra note 13, art. 340.  See also Case C-
224/01, Köbler v. Austria, 2003 E.C.R. I-10239 (adding that Member States are also 
liable under the Francovich principle for breaches of Community law occasioned 
by judicial decisions); Case C-352/98, Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm 
SA v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. I-5291 (re-affirming that the Community or Member 
States may only be held liable for damages when the rule of Community law that 
is infringed was intended to confer rights on individuals, when the breach is 
sufficiently serious (in particular whether the relevant institution “manifestly and 
gravely disregarded limits on its discretion”), and there is a direct causal link 
between the breach of the obligation and the loss or damage caused to the 
individual); Lenaerts & Gutman, supra note 43, at 78–96 (describing the 
development of Member State liability); see generally van Gerven, supra note 43 
(arguing that the development of Member State liability has led to an increasingly 
uniform system of tort rules among Member States).  These areas are, however, 
perhaps better described as quasi-administrative in character because they 
necessarily involve disputes between public and private parties, and are not the 
focus of attention in this Article. 
53 See Treaty on European Union, supra note 13, art. 6(3). 
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required to develop their law in light of these principles.  This is 
illustrated, for example, by the evolution of the private law 
doctrine of breach of confidence in the U.K. to reflect (and protect) 
the right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, as interpreted by the European Court of Human 
Rights.54  While U.K. courts have recognized that ECHR rights do 
not have a direct horizontal effect under the Human Rights Act 
1998, they have nevertheless accepted that the courts themselves, 
as a public authority, must not “act in a way which is incompatible 
with a Convention right” in exercising their powers to develop the 
common law.55
Despite these developments, the limitations on the powers of 
European institutions in dealing with private law remain 
significant.  The piecemeal progress in this field has frustrated 




3.1.2. The Emergence of Subsidiarity 
 
In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht significantly expanded the 
powers of European institutions, a development which also 
followed on from a period of increasing intensity of European 
 
54 See, e.g., Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. (No. 3) [2007] UKHL 21, ¶118 (“English law 
has adapted the action for breach of confidence to provide a remedy for the 
unauthorized disclosure of personal information . . . [developed] by the analogy 
of the right to privacy conferred by article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights . . . .”); see also Campbell v. MGN Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22 (considering 
the influence of the European Convention on Human Rights in the development 
of the tort of breach of confidence under the common law). 
55 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 6 (U.K.). 
56 See, e.g., Zimmermann, supra note 44, at 479 (describing the variety of 
sources of European private law, and determining that these measures are not yet 
coherent enough to create a European Civil Code); HUGH COLLINS, THE EUROPEAN 
CIVIL CODE: THE WAY FORWARD (2008) (arguing for a Civil Code to provide more 
cooperative European governance); Albors-Llorens, supra note 45, at 266 
(discussing the interactions between consumer law and competition law, and 
suggesting that the two will aid in the development of European private law).  See 
generally TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE (Arthur S. Hartkamp et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2004) (presenting various arguments regarding the feasibility and desirability of a 
European civil code); MARTIJN W. HESSELINK, THE NEW EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: 
ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE (Kluwer Law International ed. 
2002); Christian von Bar, From Principles to Codification: Prospects for European 
Private Law, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 379 (2002) (outlining the past and present debate 
over the creation of a European Civil Code); Christoph U. Schmid, Legitimacy 
Conditions for a European Civil Code, 8 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 277 (2001) 
(recommending a civil code unifying European transactional law). 
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regulatory activity.  It is no coincidence that this development was 
accompanied by the adoption of the principle of subsidiarity—an 
attempt to provide reassurance and security that Member State 
“sovereignty” would not be unduly affected by these expanded 
powers.  The enlargement in E.U. powers in the Treaty of 
Maastricht was a challenge to the European Union’s constitutional 
settlement—a potential rewriting of the implied ‘hard-wired’ 
subsidiarity in its allocation of competences.  The introduction of 
subsidiarity as a legal and political principle into the constitutional 
practice of the European Union is therefore best understood as a 
counter to this potential unbalancing of the federal system—not as 
a purely opposing decentralizing principle, but as a methodology 
for ensuring balance.57  Subsidiarity assisted in the difficult 
political negotiations for the expansion of European competence; it 
was “a glue to help keep support for the Maastricht Treaty from 
coming unstuck.”58  It achieved this by allowing a legal 
codification of the idea that E.U. federalism should not, after all, be 
“an ever closer union,” but should be an attempt to strive for some 
sort of rational negotiated balance between different levels of 
regulation.  This movement has also been supported by the 
increased influence of U.S. theories of regulatory competition in 
the European Union, bringing the idea that efficiency may in some 
circumstances be enhanced rather than impeded by diversity.59
 
57 See, e.g., Denis J. Edwards, Fearing Federalism’s Failure: Subsidiarity in the 
European Union, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 537, 543 (1996) (discussing the connection 
between federalism and subsidiarity, and whether the principle can 
counterbalance consolidation of power); Bermann, supra note 14, at 346 
(highlighting “the connection between subsidiarity and the expansion of the 
Community’s powers”); Bermann, supra note 36, at 386–90 (outlining the 
emergence of the subsidiarity doctrine in the European context and discussing its 
use as a mechanism for the balancing of power); ESTELLA, supra note 9 (viewing 
subsidiarity as a reaction by states to the growing centralized power of the 
European community); Henkel, supra note 9 (describing the subsidiarity principle 
as a functional one to ensure balance of powers within the European Union). 
  
58  Deborah Z. Cass, The Word to Save Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity 
and the Division of Powers in the European Community, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1107 
(1992) (describing the substantial role the principle of subsidiarity played in the 
acceptance of various European political instruments and institutions); Peterson, 
supra note 28, at 121; see also Marquardt, supra note 9, at 625 (“Subsidiarity 
provided useful cover to national politicians factoring Euro-skeptical criticism of 
Maastricht at home.”); Schilling, supra note 18, at 207 (asserting that the principle 
of subsidiarity assisted in the success of the Maastricht Conference and in quelling 
fears regarding the Treaty on European Union). 
59 See infra text accompanying note 137.  See generally REGULATORY 
COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Daniel C. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
MILLS.DOC 1/13/2011 6:46 PM 
394 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:2 
The further conviction that subsidiarity promotes democratic 
legitimacy also has a particularly strong normative pull in the 
European Union, where doubts persist over the democratic 
credentials of federal institutions.60
Since its adoption in the Treaty of Maastricht,
 
61 the principle of 
subsidiarity has played an important legal and political role in 
mediating competing claims for progressive federalization and for 
continued diversity and decentralization of regulation.62  In this 
context, subsidiarity essentially means that any regulation at the 
E.U. level, outside those areas given to its exclusive competence, 
must be justified on the grounds that its objectives cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States.  This leaves open the 
question of what role there should be for the courts in evaluating 
such “justifications”—should they merely check (as a procedural 
matter) whether the issue has been rationally considered and a 
justification offered, or should they (as a substantive matter) 
engage in review of the persuasiveness of the argument for E.U. 
rules.  As a legal doctrine, subsidiarity particularly invites the 
European Court of Justice to shift its focus of attention away from 
the Member States, where (as noted above) it has been the engine 
of developments in ensuring the effectiveness of E.U. law.  Instead, 
it is asked to develop the character of an independent 
“constitutional” court by looking more critically ‘inward’ at the 
internal validity of E.U. legislation,63
 
Esty & Damien Géradin eds., 2001); Wolfgang Kerber, Interjurisdictional 
Competition within the European Union, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S217 (2000) 
(analyzing the present and potential role of jurisdictional competition within 
Europe); Anthony Ogus, Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution 
of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 405 (1999) 
(analyzing the effects of regulatory competition on legal development). 
 and perhaps even at the 
60 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
61 As previously noted, subsidiarity is now defined in the Treaty on 
European Union, art. 5(3).  See supra note 13. 
62 See generally NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, 
AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 137 (1999) (describing the long 
European debate over the role of sovereignty, particularly the competing places of 
subsidiarity and democracy); Reimer von Borries & Malte Hauschild, 
Implementing the Subsidiarity Principle, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 369 (1999) (discussing 
the meaning of subsidiarity and providing examples of the principle applied in 
German administration); Edwards, supra note 57, at 543 (looking at Europe’s 
movement towards federalism and its connection to subsidiarity); Schilling, supra 
note 18, at 207 (stressing the important role subsidiarity has played in the debate 
over European centralization of power). 
63 See, e.g., Trevor C. Hartley, Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the 
Maastricht Agreement, 42 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 213, 217 (1993) (noting that “the 
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fundamental doctrines of E.U. law developed by the ECJ itself,64 in 
order to preserve a federal balance that makes room for diverse 
Member States.65
European Courts initially appeared reluctant to rely on 
subsidiarity as a justiciable basis for judicial review, and it is 
unclear whether this hesitancy is being overcome.
   
66
 
effectiveness of subsidiarity will depend, to a considerable extent, on the attitude 
and policy of the European Court,” but observing that “[u]ntil now, the Court’s 
policy has always been to expand Community power and to restrict that of the 
member States”); Florian Sander, Subsidiarity Infringements Before the European 
Court of Justice: Futile Interference with Politics or a Substantial Step Towards EU 
Federalism?, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 517 (2006) (addressing the potential importance of 
judicial review of subsidiarity); W. Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity Principle in 
European Union Law—American Federalism Compared, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 61, 
80 (1995) (comparing subsidiarity to federalism). 
  
64 See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the 
European Court of Justice, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 9 (2000) (arguing that the ECJ 
should reconsider the Francovich principle in light of subsidiarity).  See generally 
Gráinne de Búrca, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an 
Institutional Actor, 36 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 217 (1998) (exploring the tension 
between the Court’s institutional role and the requirements of subsidiarity).  See 
also Bermann, supra note 14, at 400 (arguing that “the Court may have difficulty 
pressing subsidiarity on the political branches, either as a procedural or a 
substantive requirement, unless it shows a willingness to examine its own 
jurisprudence from a subsidiarity point of view”). 
65 See, e.g., Nathan Horst, Note, Creating an Ever Closer Union: The European 
Court of Justice and the Threat to Cultural Diversity, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 165 
(2008) (arguing that subsidiarity may play a role in reducing the threat posed by 
the ECJ to Member State cultural diversity). 
66 See, e.g., Case T-253/02, Ayadi v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. II-2139 (suggesting 
that a common foreign and security policy cannot violate the principle of 
subsidiarity); Case C-491/01, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Health ex. parte 
British Am. Tobacco (Investments) Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-11550 (rejecting the 
claimant’s argument that a Directive regulating the manufacture, presentation 
and sale of tobacco products is invalid on subsidiarity grounds); Case C-377/98, 
Netherlands v. Parliament, 2001 E.C.R. I-7079 (finding sufficient compliance with 
the principle of subsidiarity within the challenged Directive); Case C-233/94, 
Germany v. Parliament, 1997 E.C.R. I-2405 (holding that an express reference to 
the principle of subsidiarity was not necessary to comply with the obligation to 
give reasons, and that Parliament and the Council did not fail to state the reasons 
on which the Directive was based because they “did explain why they considered 
that their action was in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity”); Henkel, 
supra note 9, at 373 (noting that “the statements of the European Council with 
regard to procedures and practices in the application of subsidiarity fall short of 
providing specific meaning”); Harrison, supra note 28, at 439 (acknowledging 
subsidiarity as justiciable but stating that the Court still faces the challenge of 
balancing Member State power with community power); Edwards, supra note 57, 
at 551 (noting that “[a]lthough some commentators have concluded that Article 3b 
is not justiciable, it is not clear either in theory or from the jurisprudence of the 
ECJ why it should not be”). 
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Encouragement is offered in the new E.U. Protocol on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, 
as amended by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, which confirms 
expressly that “[t]he Court of Justice of the European Union shall 
have jurisdiction in actions on grounds of infringement of the 
principle of subsidiarity by a legislative act”.67  In practice, 
subsidiarity has been interpreted in a way that tends to emphasize 
its procedural rather than substantive implications,68 perhaps 
reflecting concerns over the appropriateness of the ECJ exercising 
powers with a strong political dimension.  The new E.U. Protocol 
on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality thus focuses on a somewhat formalistic conception 
of subsidiarity, emphasizing its role in parliamentary procedure 
(involving both the European Union and Member States).69  
Nevertheless, subsidiarity has also had a substantive role in the 
emergence of a broader political and legal policy in support of 
balancing European unification with preserving diversity in 
Member State legal orders.70
 
67 Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality, supra note 30, art. 8.  The Protocol includes the further innovation 
that “the Committee of the Regions may also bring such actions against legislative 
acts for the adoption of which the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union provides that it be consulted.”  Id.  See generally Robert Schütze, Subsidiarity 
after Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federalism?, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 525, 531 
(2009) (arguing that the ECJ has tended to leave substantive subsidiarity analysis 
in the hands of the Community legislator).  
  While subsidiarity may support 
retaining national regulation, it offers a new vocabulary to replace 
the nationalist language of ‘sovereignty’ that has traditionally 
characterized debates about the allocation of regulatory authority 
within the European Union, seeking to reposition those debates 
within the framework of the European Union and redefine them 
according to legal doctrine.  
68 See generally von Borries & Hauschild, supra note 62, at 370 (expounding on 
the meaning of subsidiarity as a principle of constitutional law and discussing its 
European implementation); Bermann, supra note 14. 
69 Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality, supra note 30; see Schütze, supra note 67, at 527 (arguing that the 
Amsterdam Protocol created “process federalism” in institutions and that it 
treated subsidiarity as a “political question”); Philipp Kiiver, The Treaty of Lisbon, 
the National Parliaments and the Principle of Subsidiarity, 15 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & 
COMP. L. 77 (2008). 
70 Subsidiarity concerns are also reflected in the accommodation of 
‘differentiated integration’ in the E.U. Treaties, whereby some Member States may 
proceed with further integration than others, as in the European Monetary Union 
and adoption of the Euro currency. 
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The constitutional exhortation in the Treaty on European 
Union toward further centralization is thus now qualified with a 
contradictory objective of “localism”—a paradoxical aspiration for 
“an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which 
decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen . . . .”71
3.1.3. Subsidiarity and European Private Law 
  This 
paradox embodies the tension between centralizing and 
decentralizing forces inherent in any federal balance of power.  The 
constitutional rebalancing of the European Union in favor of 
federalized powers (involving subsidiarity conceived as a matter of 
constitutional settlement) has been countered by the introduction 
of subsidiarity as a matter of legal and political constitutional 
practice. 
It is difficult to determine the precise impact of the emergence 
of the principle of subsidiarity on the development of 
Europeanized private law.  While the long-term objective of 
achieving harmonized European private law continues to have 
support within E.U. institutions72 and among academic research 
groups,73
 
71  Treaty on European Union, supra note 13, pmbl.  This sentiment is 
similarly emphasized in art. 1, which provides that “[t]his Treaty marks a new 
stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, 
in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the 
citizen.”  Id. 
 the project has also faced significant opposition, drawing 
on two types of arguments.  The first questions whether 
harmonization exceeds the scope of existing European powers—
72 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Serving the Citizen, COM 
(2009) 262 final (June 10, 2009) sec. 3.4.2.  
73 See generally JOINT NETWORK ON EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, 
http://www.copecl.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (indentifying and compiling 
principles of European private law); STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, 
http://www.sgecc.net (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (a network of academics 
conducting comparative private law research in E.U. Member States); THE 
COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW PROJECT, http://www.common-
core.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (a group dedicated to indentifying core 
principles of European private law among the different E.U. Member State legal 
systems); COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, 
http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_contract_law/index.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (endeavoring to identify and codify common 
“Principles of European Contract Law”); EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, 
http://www.egtl.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (a network of scholars discussing 
fundamental issues of tort law liability in Europe, which has drafted a collection 
of “Principles of European Tort Law”).   
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this might be characterized as the question of whether 
harmonization violates subsidiarity as reflected in the 
constitutional settlement.  The second asks a more policy-oriented 
question about whether, even if constitutional, the development of 
European private law might contravene values such as national 
culture or autonomy—the question of whether harmonization 
might violate subsidiarity as a matter of constitutional practice.74
The continued prominence of Directives as the form of private 
law regulatory instrument itself reflects concerns of subsidiarity—a 
determination that European rules should “leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods” of implementation, 
leading to a “hybridization” of European principles or objectives 
with diverse national implementations.
 
75  The impact of 
subsidiarity, and the doubts over the possible legal and political 
basis for wider European legislation in the field of private law, 
may also be felt in the preference in much of the literature for 
“bottom up” harmonization, through identifying and encouraging 
a congruence of private law across the Member States, rather than 
the “top down” imposition of centralized rules.  However 
necessary harmonized regulation may be, if it can be achieved 
through horizontal coordination, the adoption of E.U. law would 
obviously fail to satisfy the requirement that “the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States.”76
 
74 See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, A Diabolical Idea, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL 
CODE, supra note 56, at 245 (arguing that a European Civil Code ought not to be 
adopted); Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. REV. 44 (1997) 
(arguing against European legal integration through a civil code); Jan Smits, 
Diversity of Contract Law and the European Internal Market, in THE NEED FOR A 
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 155 (Jan Smits ed., 
2005); Stephen Weatherill, Reflections on the EC’s Competence to Develop a ‘European 
Contract Law’, 13 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 405, 406 (2005) (supporting the 
Commission’s hesitance to assert constitutional competence to develop a 
European contract law); Stephen Weatherill, Why Object to the Harmonization of 
Private Law by the EC?, 12 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 633 (2004) (discussing 
constitutional, cultural, and economic objections to the harmonization of 
European private law). 
  The possibility of horizontal harmonization presents a 
counter-factual which will be problematic for advocates of federal 
rules in the face of subsidiarity requirements—it is difficult to 
75 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 13, art. 288.  
See generally Angus Johnston & Hannes Unberath, European Private Law by 
Directives: Approach and Challenges, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO EUROPEAN 
UNION PRIVATE LAW (Christian Twigg-Flesner ed., 2010). 
76 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 13, art. 5(3).  
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justify federal rules in the absence of a genuine failed attempt at 
state-level coordination.77  The rejection of “a soulless and 
authoritarian uniform solution” has led to the “rise of comparative 
law from a new and allegedly impractical branch of legal 
methodology at the beginning of the last century, to a catalyst for 
the development of European private law at the outset of this 
century . . . .”78  Inspiration is thus often sought from similar U.S. 
experiences with uniform law projects, particularly the Uniform 
Commercial Code, which are discussed below.79
In the European Union, a great deal of recent attention and 





77 See supra text accompanying notes 31–32.  
  A ‘Draft Common Frame of Reference’ document, 
prepared with the support of the European Commission and 
submitted to European institutions in 2008, is under continuing 
78 Ivan Sammut, Tying the Knot in European Private Law, 17 EUR. REV. PRIVATE 
L. 813, 814 (2009).  
79 See infra Part 4.1.3; Sammut, supra note 78, at 837 (suggesting that Europe is 
moving slowly toward American-style uniform statutes); Richard Hyland, The 
American Experience: Restatements, the UCC, Uniform Laws, and Transnational 
Coordination, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 56, at 59 (surveying 
American developments in harmonizing diverse fields of law and suggesting that 
codifying European law is possible); Mathias Reimann, Towards a European Civil 
Code: Why Continental Jurists Should Consult Their Transatlantic Colleagues, 73 TUL. 
L. REV. 1337, 1345 (1998) (suggesting that European jurists crafting a civil code 
should consult their North American counterparts, especially those in Louisiana 
and Quebec, who have experience in codifying private law in mixed civil and 
common law jurisdictions). 
80 See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council, European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: The Way Forward, 
COM (2004) 651; European Parliament Resolution on European Contract Law and 
the Revision of the Acquis: The Way Forward, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6_TA (2006) 0109.  
See also STEFAN VOGENAUER & STEPHEN WEATHERILL, THE HARMONISATION OF 
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAWS, BUSINESS 
AND LEGAL PRACTICE 136 (2006) (discussing whether the harmonization of 
European contract law is necessary or at least desirable); Martijn W. Hesselink, 
The European Commission’s Action Plan: Towards a More Coherent European Contract 
Law?, 12 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 397 (2004) (arguing that a European Code of 
Contracts could be favorable regardless of its practical impact on market 
functionality or coherence in law); Dirk Staudenmayer, The Way Forward in 
European Contract Law, 13 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 95 (2005); TWIGG-FLESNER, supra 
note 44, at 179 (examining developments in the Europeanization of contract law); 
Whittaker, supra note 45, at 618 (discussing the purposes behind the initiative to 
create a “Common Frame of Reference”); Zimmermann, supra note 44, at 480–82 
(discussing the present state of European private law and its origins); Smits, supra 
note 74. 
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consideration.81  In part, this is simply “an exercise in applied 
comparative law, designed to nourish a dynamic process of co-
ordinated learning in Europe.”82  A further part of the strategy 
which appears to be favored is to establish an (at least partly) 
optional European contract law, as an alternative system to that of 
the Member States, which private parties might choose to govern 
their contracts.  Such a measure is anticipated under Recital 14 of 
the Rome I Regulation (2008) on choice of law in contract, which 
provides that “[s]hould the Community adopt, in an appropriate 
legal instrument, rules of substantive contract law, including 
standard terms and conditions, such instrument may provide that 
the parties may choose to apply those rules.”83  A fruitful 
comparison here might be with the pre-1938 coexistence of federal 
and state common law in the United States operating in regulatory 
competition84
Setting aside such aspirations, at present the development of 
European private law remains fragmented, occurring only where it 
is indirectly permitted by other legal developments authorized 
under the E.U. Treaties, or as an indirect effect of community 
values, as examined above.  The expansion in ‘federal’ powers 
under the E.U. Treaties has thus had a limited effect on questions 
of private law.  While there is a range of legal and political 
considerations behind this, ideas of subsidiarity have certainly 
played a role in ensuring that the treaty allocation of (non-
exclusive) powers to European institutions remains subject to 
contestation as a matter of constitutional practice. 
—the theory that a rival federal law might provide a 
model for the improvement of state private law.   
3.2. Subsidiarity and the Conflict of Laws 
In the early years of the European Union, there was some 
significant progress made in the establishment of Europeanized 
rules of conflict of laws, in particular through the Brussels 
 
81 The draft document is published as PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL 
RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) 
(Christian von Bar & Eric Clive eds., 2009).  
82 Weatherill, Reflections on the EC’s Competence to Develop a ‘European Contract 
Law’, supra note 74, at 409.  
83 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6. 
84 See infra text accompanying note 143.   
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Convention (1968)85—which introduced common rules on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters—and the Rome Convention (1980)86—which 
dealt with choice of law in contract.  It is notable that these 
developments were in the form of separate treaties between 
European Member States, and not European legal instruments.  
This reflected concerns as to the regulatory competence of the 
European Union in the field of the conflict of laws, in the absence 
of an express treaty provision covering the field—questions of 
whether the constitutional settlement supported or justified 
centralized conflict of laws regulation. This in turn reflects the lack 
of centrality of the conflict of laws in early thinking about the 
European Union,87 except where it arose incidentally in the 
fragmented development of topics of substantive private law.88
The conclusion of these separate treaties by the Member States 
may, however, be understood as a form of ad hoc amendment of 
the constitutional settlement—centralizing (‘federalizing’) 
regulation in the affected subject matter without the need for 
express treaty amendment.  It thus involves a reconsideration of 
the subsidiarity question of whether such federalized rules of 
conflict of laws are necessary.  This reconsideration, and the new 
centrality of E.U. conflict of laws, was formally reflected in the new 
regulatory powers covering the conflict of laws in the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (now the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union), introduced in 1997 by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. As amended and renumbered by the Lisbon 
Treaty (2009), Article 81(2) now provides (in part) that: 
 
 
85 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1 (consolidated 
version).  
86 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
(consolidated version), Jan. 26, 1998, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 36.  
87 But see DOMINIK LASOK & PETER STONE, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY 25–81 (1987) (discussing the treaty provisions that affect the conflict 
of laws); IAN F. FLETCHER, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 400 
(1982) (analyzing the characteristics of the European Community legal structure 
and its implications for conflict of laws); Ulrich Drobnig, Conflict of Laws and the 
European Economic Community, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 204, 205 (1967) (discussing the 
role conflict of laws might have in the development of a new economic-political 
entity in Europe). 
88 See generally Aude Fiorini, The Evolution of European Private International 
Law, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 969, 970 (2008) (tracing the historical development of 
European conflict of laws); Basedow, supra note 44, at 2141 (examining the impact 
of European legislation on choice of law in interstate conflicts). 
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the European Parliament and the Council . . . shall adopt 
measures, particularly when necessary for the proper 
functioning of the internal market, aimed at ensuring: 
(a) the mutual recognition and enforcement between 
Member States of judgments and of decisions in 
extrajudicial cases; 
. . . 
(c) the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member 
States concerning conflict of laws and of jurisdiction.  
Drawing on this authorization, there has been a dramatic 
increase in recent years in the development of European conflict of 
laws instruments, covering jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments (including the Brussels I 
Regulation (2001)89 and Brussels II bis Regulation (2005)90), as well as 
the determination of the applicable law in both contract (under the 
Rome I Regulation (2008)91) and tort (under the Rome II Regulation 
(2007)92
The exercise of these powers is effecting a revolutionary 
transformation of the conflict of laws.  These changes are not just 
developments in the sources of conflict of laws, but an increasingly 
widely recognized fundamental shift in its purpose and character, 





89 Council Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, EC/44/2001, L/12/2 (Dec. 22, 2000).  
 
90 Council Regulation concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental 
responsibility, Nov. 27, 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 338) 1. 
91 Council Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations, 
EC/593/2008, L/177/6 (June 17, 2008).  
92 Council Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, 
EC/864/2007, L/199/40 (July 11, 2007). 
93 See sources cited, supra note 8; Jürgen Basedow, The Communitarization of 
the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 687, 691 
(2000) (discussing the impact of the treaty of Amsterdam on the conflict of laws in 
the European Community); Christian Joerges, The Challenges of Europeanization in 
the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 149, 166 (2004) (arguing that European law demands a reconceptualization of 
private international law); Horatia Muir Watt, Choice of Law in Integrated and 
Interconnected Markets: A Matter of Political Economy, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 383, 402 
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The principle of subsidiarity is involved in this allocation of 
power in two ways.  First, there is the question of subsidiarity in 
the regulation of the conflict of laws—which level of government 
should have power over conflicts issues.  Here, the E.U. Treaties 
have now determined that federal regulation is within E.U. 
powers, and thus (as a matter of constitutional settlement) 
potentially justified.  This is, however, clearly territory in which 
competence is shared with the Member States, and thus challenges 
may still be made to the European regulation of the conflict of laws 
on the basis of subsidiarity arguments.  Lawyers in the United 
Kingdom, in particular, faced with the unfamiliar approaches 
adopted in these European rules (which emphasize public law 
certainty and predictability rather than private law flexibility and 
discretion), have questioned the necessity for European 
regulation—essentially (although not always expressly) 
challenging the compatibility of the exercise of these powers with 
the principle of subsidiarity.94
 
(2003) (analyzing the role of conflict of laws as a market regulatory technique); 
Horatia Muir Watt, Integration and Diversity: The Conflict of Laws as a Regulatory 
Tool, in THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, 107–48 
(Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2006) (exploring the conflict of laws as a European 
regulatory technique); Horatia Muir Watt, European Integration, Legal Diversity and 
the Conflict of Laws, 9 EDINBURGH L. REV. 6, 16 (2005) (arguing that the conflict of 
laws could provide a more effective tool of multi-level governance if permitted to 
incorporate a regulatory function); Fiorini, supra note 88, at 969 (arguing that the 
Treaty of Amsterdam has “radically reformed the position and status of private 
international law”). 
  To some extent, these concerns are 
recognized in the requirement in Article 81 of the Treaty on the 
94 See, e.g., Andrew Dickinson, European Private International Law: Embracing 
New Horizons or Mourning the Past?, 1 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 197 (2005) (critically 
examining the scope of E.U. competence in conflict of laws); Richard Fentiman, 
Choice of Law in Europe: Uniformity and Integration, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2021, 2043 (2008) 
(arguing that “it might be wondered why [the Brussels Convention] was relevant 
in a case involving the allocation of jurisdiction between a member state and a 
nonmember state” given its internal market objectives); Trevor C. Hartley, The 
European Union and the Systematic Dismantling of the Common Law of Conflict of Laws, 
54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 813, 828 (2005) (suggesting that the “crass insistence that 
common law rules must be abolished even where no Community interest is at 
stake is the feature . . . that will cause most difficulty for lawyers in England”); 
C.J.S. Knight, Owusu and Turner: The Shark in the Water?, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 288 
(2007) (discussing the common law impact of the ECJ’s decisions in Owusu v. 
Jackson and Turner v. Grovit); Adrian Briggs, Note, The Death of Harrods: Forum 
Non Conveniens and the European Court, 121 LAW Q. REV. 535, 538 (2005) 
(criticizing the ECJ’s ruling in Owusu v. Jackson).  For similar controversy in France 
concerning European regulation of private international law, see La Semaine 
Juridique - Édition Générale (JCP G), Dec. 13, 2006, act. 586, and Jan. 10, 2007, act. 18.  
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Functioning of the European Union, that regulation be adopted 
“particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the 
internal market.”95  This is, however, a much weaker constraint 
than that offered prior to the Lisbon Treaty (2009), where the 
predecessor to Article 81 provided that regulation be taken only 
“in so far as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal 
market.”96
Arguments against the necessity of E.U. conflicts rules have, 
however, had very limited success.  The use of Regulations to 
establish European standards for conflict of laws is itself 
significant—the certainty they achieve is preferred to the use of 
Directives (favored, by contrast, in the context of private law
 
97) that 
leave the details of implementation to the Member States and are 
thus automatically more sympathetic to considerations of 
subsidiarity.  This broadly defined internal competence has also 
been extended to cover external relations—the power to enter into 
treaties governing the conflict of laws—in a move which itself 
offers a further justification for federalized regulation as it 
arguably enhances the possibility for the European Union to 
participate in international efforts to harmonize conflict of laws.98
The second way in which subsidiarity is involved in this 
allocation of power is in its effect on the allocation of regulatory 
competence concerning private law, which, as explored above, 
remains largely outside E.U. powers.  The harmonization of 
conflicts rules attempts to impose a public ordering on the 
relations between the diverse private law systems of the European 
 
 
95 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 13, art. 81(2). 
96 Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 65, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 
O.J. (C 321) 68 (consolidated version). 
97 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.  
98 See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 13, art. 
3(2) (establishing “exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international 
agreement when its conclusion . . . may affect common rules or alter their scope”); 
Opinion 1/03 on the Competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano 
Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters  (Feb. 7, 2006) E.C.R. I-1145 (recognizing an implied 
exclusive external competence for the European Union); see also Fiorini, supra note 
88, at 981–82 (discussing the external competence of the Community with respect 
to private international law); Andrea Schulz, The Accession of the European 
Community to the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 56 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 939, 939–42 (2007) (discussing the developments that led to the European 
Community’s request for accession and the legal and political issues that had to 
be resolved).  This may be contrasted with the situation in the United States.  See 
infra note 290 and accompanying text.  
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Member States.  In so doing, it decreases the necessity for 
European harmonization of substantive law—it provides a 
mechanism which supports and affirms the coexistence of diverse 
national rules of private law, and thus acts in support of the 
principle of subsidiarity.  As the European Commission has 
expressly acknowledged: 
[t]he technique of harmonising conflict-of-laws rules fully 
respects the subsidiarity and proportionality principles 
since it enhances certainty in the law without demanding 
harmonisation of the substantive rules of domestic law.99
It may thus be argued that the need for federal conflict of laws 
rules, to satisfy subsidiarity requirements, is at least partly justified 
by the fact that it supports the ordered coexistence of diverse state 
private law, which satisfies a second level of subsidiarity 
requirements.  Subsidiarity at the same time both asks and answers 
the question of why federal rules on the conflict of laws are 
necessary. 
 
A recent illustration is the proposal, discussed above, to create 
a new (at least partly) optional European contract law, allowing the 
parties to choose this as the legal system governing their 
contracts.100
This change in European regulatory strategy, a shift of focus 
from centralized harmonization to the coordination of diversity, is 
also reflected in other developments.  The principle of ‘mutual 
recognition’ developed by the ECJ
  Allowing such a choice would require the partial 
Europeanization of choice of law rules in contract, to adapt the 
rules on party autonomy. However, this centralization of conflict of 
laws (which has of course already been achieved through the Rome 
Convention (1980) and now the Rome I Regulation (2008)) supports 
the possibility of decentralized private law—the proposal for 
European contract law to be optional rather than adopted as a 
matter of European law. 
101 and reflected in the adoption 
of a ‘country of origin rule’ in various contexts,102
 
99 Commission for the European Communities, Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to Non-
Contractual Obligations (“ROME II”), at 7, COM (2003) 427 Final (July 22, 2003).   
 for example, may 
100 See supra text accompanying note 83. 
101 See, e.g., Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für 
Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649. 
102 See, e.g., Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC); Case C-
212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459, 1483 
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not reflect traditional conflicts methodology, but functions to 
similar effect as a method to regulate the coexistence of different 
Member State legal orders.103
New conflict of laws rules and techniques are thus emerging as 
part of a new “federalist” European law, which orders the co-
existence of the private law systems of the different Member States 
within the internal market.  A striking feature of this development 
is its similarity to the role historically played by the conflict of laws 
in the United States, which is examined below.
  
104
3.3. The Horizontal Effect of Subsidiarity on Choice of Law 
 
When analyzing the influence of the doctrine of subsidiarity on 
E.U. law, the focus of attention is naturally on its vertical effect, as 
considered above—its impact on the balance between central and 
subsidiary (state) legal orders.  It is less appreciated that 
subsidiarity may also be viewed as having a horizontal effect, on 
the distribution of regulatory authority between the Member 
States.105
 
(holding that a company that has been formed in accordance with the law of one 
Member State can register a branch in any other Member State); Case C-208/00, 
Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. I-9919, 
9941 (holding that the principle of freedom of establishment requires Member 
States to recognize companies incorporated in other Member States); Case C-
167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art 
Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-10155, 10233 (holding that national laws which restrict freedom 
of establishment must be proportionate and necessary to protect a public interest 
objective). 
  This is because subsidiarity requires that regulation take 
103 See Basedow, supra note 44, at 2130 (discussing a “second layer of legal 
principles that address transborder situations”); Geert De Baere, ‘Is this a conflict 
rule which I see before me?’ Looking for a Hidden Conflict Rule in the Principle of Origin 
as Implemented in Primary European Community Law and in the ‘Directive on 
Electronic Commerce’, 11 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 287, 289 (2004) (examining 
whether the country of origin principle contains a hidden conflict rule); Ralf 
Michaels, EU Law as Private International Law? Reconceptualising the Country-of-
Origin Principle as Vested-Rights Theory, 2 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 195, 198 (2006) 
(arguing that the country-of-origin principle in E.U. law is best understood by 
comparing it to the vested rights theory in private international law); Michael 
Hellner, The Country of Origin Principle in the E-commerce Directive—A Conflict with 
Conflict of Laws?, 12 EUR. REV. PRIVATE. L. 193, 194 (2004) (analyzing the application 
of the country of origin principle with respect to e-commerce); MILLS, supra note 
12, at 200; Muir Watt, Integration and Diversity: The Conflict of Laws as a Regulatory 
Tool, supra note 93 at 107–48 (comparing conflict of laws rules with other 
European regulatory techniques). 
104 See infra Part 4.2. 
105 See, e.g., Barber, supra note 9, at 312 (arguing that subsidiarity “does not 
just embody a preference for smaller units over large ones: it allocates powers to 
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place as close as possible to those affected by it—this does not only 
mean at the lowest level possible, but in the most appropriate 
location. 
Viewed in this light, subsidiarity may potentially have an 
impact not only on the existence of E.U. choice of law rules, as 
analyzed above, but also on their content.  Subsidiarity appears to 
require that choice of law rules select the applicable law based on 
the values which underpin subsidiarity itself—that the people who 
are likely to be affected by a regulation should have the 
opportunity to participate in the process under which that 
regulation is made.  Put this way, subsidiarity appears to require 
something akin to an ‘interest analysis’ in designing choice of law 
rules—the law chosen must be the law of the place which is most 
affected by the issue.106
While ordinarily it would be expected that choice of law rules 
would meet this criterion, it remains a reminder that such rules 
should be evaluated not merely on their efficiency, but on the 
appropriateness of their allocation of regulatory authority.  This 
may be important in framing a critique of choice of law rules.  For 
example, this could be a basis for questioning the appropriateness 
of the law of the place of habitual residence
 
107 of the characteristic 
performer as the basic choice of law rule in contract under Article 4 
of both the Rome Convention (1980) and Rome I Regulation (2008). 
The Giuliano-Lagarde Report,108 prepared by the drafters of the 
Rome Convention (1980), obliquely acknowledges the principle 
underlying this argument, when it makes the much criticized claim 
that the characteristic performer rule “essentially links the contract 
to the social and economic environment of which it will form a 
part.”109
 
the states containing the people who will be affected by the power”); MILLS, supra 
note 12, at 106. 
  It is at least open to argument that the place where the 
106 See MILLS, supra note 12, at 259; infra note 269–70 and accompanying text.  
107 This is subject to exceptions under Article 4(2) of the Rome Convention 
(1980), and is specially defined in Article 19 of the Rome I Regulation (2008). 
108 Council Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations, 1980 O.J. (C 282) 1. 
109 Id. at 20.  For examples of criticism, see C.G.J. Morse, The EEC Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 2 Y.B. EUR. L. 107, 131 (1982) 
(questioning the suitability of the characteristic performer test); Hans Ulrich 
Jessurun D’Oliveira, “Characteristic Obligation’ in the Draft EEC Obligation 
Convention, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 326 (1977) (emphasizing that determining 
characteristic performance does not conclusively select the law most connected 
with the contract); Lawrence Collins, Contractual Obligations—The EEC Preliminary 
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contract is to be performed has a greater interest in determining 
whether and how that performance is carried out, although some 
accommodation of that law may be made under the exceptions in 
Article 4(5) of the Rome Convention (1980) and Articles 4(3) and 9(3) 
of the Rome I Regulation (2008).  Regardless of these specific 
doctrinal questions, the general point remains that subsidiarity 
should be recognized as having not only a vertical dimension, 
affecting the distribution of powers between federal and state 
levels, and thus the ‘federalization’ of the conflict of laws, but also 
a horizontal dimension, affecting the distribution of powers 
between states, and thus the content of conflicts rules. 
4. SUBSIDIARITY, PRIVATE LAW, AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
As in the European Union, the early development of law in the 
United States, particularly by the federal courts, enthusiastically 
reflected the constitutional imperative to create “a more perfect 
Union”110 out of formerly independent states.  This imperative is 
evidently in tension with the delicate federal-state relationship set 
out overall in the Constitution, a “model that balanced centripetal 
and centrifugal political forces—a harmonious Newtonian solar 
system in which individual states were preserved as distinct 
spheres, each with its own mass and pull, maintained in their 
proper orbit by the gravitational force of a common central 
body.”111
4.1. Private Law and the Emergence of Subsidiarity 
  Nevertheless, the initial momentum of federalization 
was necessarily toward the centre, and one aspect of this was the 
development of new rules of private law for federal courts. 
The U.S. Constitution, like the E.U. Treaties, does not grant 
federal authorities a general power to make rules of private law.  
Federal statutes based on other specific powers have had some 
impact on U.S. private law, like the incremental and fragmented 
development of E.U. private law.  In the United States this has been 
 
Draft Convention on Private International Law, 25 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 35, 45 (1976) 
(suggesting that the characteristic performer test “do[es] not necessarily lead to 
the appropriate governing law”). 
110 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
111 Amar, supra note 20, at 1449. 
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based primarily on the Commerce Clause,112 which has (at times) 
been interpreted to authorize a wide scope of federal regulation, as 
will be explored further below.113
4.1.1. Swift v. Tyson 
  But for present purposes the 
most significant engine for the development of federal private law 
in the United States has not been Congress but rather the federal 
courts, and it is this judge-made law which is the central focus of 
this section. 
For almost a century after the Supreme Court decision in Swift 
v. Tyson,114 federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction (that is, 
jurisdiction over a dispute involving parties from more than one 
state115
[T]he true interpretation and effect [of contracts and other 
instruments of a commercial nature] are to be sought, not in 
the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general 
principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence. . . .  
The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly 
declared . . . to be in a great measure, not the law of a single 
country only, but of the commercial world.
) applied and developed ‘federal common law’ in the 
absence of binding state or federal statutory authority.  Justice 
Story, also the leading U.S. conflicts lawyer of the early nineteenth 
century, delivered the judgment for the Court, finding that: 
116
 
112 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (vesting Congress with the power “[t]o regulate 
commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes”). 
 
113 See, e.g., infra Part 4.1.4. 
114 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).  See generally TONY A. FREYER, HARMONY 
AND DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981) 
(discussing the balance of state and national relations in the context of the Swift 
and Erie cases); William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 25 (1963) (claiming that Swift v. Tyson discharged the federal responsibility 
implicit in the U.S. Constitution’s full faith and credit clause); Walter Wheeler 
Cook, The Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws, 36 ILL. L. REV. 493, 516 (1942) 
(arguing that the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson was unconstitutional because of Justice 
Story’s erroneous construction of existing statutes); Arthur Taylor Von Mehren, 
Conflict of Laws in a Federal System: Some Perspectives, 18 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 681, 683 
(1969) (noting that before 1938, federal courts would apply a judicially developed 
substantive rule in diversity cases).  
115 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3) (2010) (granting U.S. 
district courts jurisdiction over conflicts arising between citizens of different 
states). 
116 Swift, 41 U.S. at 19. 
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The true significance of this judgment is a matter of debate—it 
has been argued that, in its contemporary context, the decision in 
Swift v. Tyson was “merely a garden-variety exposition of the 
prevailing view of the law applicable in diversity cases, not the 
fountainhead of an unprecedented and bizarre doctrine for which 
the opinion is often taken.”117  What is clear is that the approach it 
adopted was initially international as well as constitutional in 
character and inspiration, arguing for the development of a federal 
common commercial law (or “federal law merchant”118) drawing 
on well established general principles of international commerce 
(sometimes referred to as the lex mercatoria), which were also 
accepted as part of U.S. law.119
 
117 Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal 
Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 114 (1993); 
see also Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1292-
93 (2007) (“Taken in historical context, the Swift Court arguably did no more than 
what New York law instructed it to do—i.e., to exercise independent judgment to 
ascertain the applicable rule of customary commercial law.”); Stewart Jay, Origins 
of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1317 (1985) (“Federal 
courts long before Swift honored established interpretations of local common law, 
just as they followed settled constructions of state statutes.  Swift did no more 
than recite the accepted understanding of this procedure . . . .”) (footnote omitted); 
Alfred B. Teton, The Story of Swift v. Tyson, 35 ILL. L. REV. 519 (1941) (discussing 
the political and legal developments that led to Swift). 
  The Court derived the right to 
118 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) 
(finding that the federal law merchant “stands as a convenient source of reference 
for fashioning federal rules applicable to . . . federal questions”); R.R. Co. v. Nat’l 
Bank, 102 U.S. 14, 55 (1880) (noting that codes, laws, and ordinances of other 
states are evidence of the general law merchant); Oates v. National Bank, 100 U.S. 
239, 246 (1879) (determining that “the courts of the United States . . . are not 
bound by the decisions of state courts upon questions of general commercial 
law”). 
119 See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE COMITY OF ERRORS: A CASE 
STUDY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 38–39 (1992) (discussing how Justice Story adopted 
but misapplied Ulrich Huber’s understanding of the doctrine of “comity of 
nations”); Anthony J. Bellia, State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 825, 889 (2005) (suggesting that until the mid-19th century, the law 
of nations “governed matters that courts today categorize as commercial law”); 
Anthony J. Bellia & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 46 (2009) (explaining that federal courts applied certain aspects 
of the law of nations “because that was the applicable rule of decision or . . . 
because such law was understood to supply the operational detail of the 
Constitution’s allocation of foreign relations powers”); Borchers, supra note 117, at 
111 (“American lawyers near the time the federal courts were created also 
believed in a general law, applicable to transstate and transnational cases”); 
Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1245, 1279 (1996) (characterizing the law of nations as “an identifiable body 
of rules and customs” which had a strong influence on state law); Stewart Jay, The 
Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 822 (1989) 
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develop the law in this way from its narrow interpretation of 
section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (known as the Rules of 
Decision Act), which provided that “the laws of the several states, 
except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United 
States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules 
of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United 
States, in cases where they apply.”120  To modern sensibilities, the 
conclusion of the Court that “laws of the several states” did not 
(except with respect to matters of local concern, like immovable 
property)121 include state common law (thereby leaving scope for 
the development of federal common law) may seem strange.  There 
was, however, a broader philosophical context to this which 
explains the Court’s approach to the statute—its interpretation 
reflected a belief in the existence and application of a non-state 
‘natural law,’ later critically described as “a transcendental body of 
law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless 
and until changed by statute.”122  Although this theory and 
together with it the international dimension of this analysis was 
rejected over the course of the nineteenth century, the power of the 
federal courts to develop general common law persisted, thereby 
establishing a federalized set of substantive legal principles of 
private law for application in diversity cases.123
 
(arguing that “it was commonly recognized that there was a body of general law 
that ‘existed by common practice and consent among a number of sovereigns’” 
(footnote omitted), which “encompassed commercial disputes between 
individuals, private disputes in admiralty, criminal offenses, and a host of issues 
that arose under what we now term public international law”); Douglas Laycock, 
Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice 
of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 281 (1992) (“There was a domain of the general 
common law, and a domain of local law, with choice-of-law rules for choosing 
between general and local law, and other choice-of-law rules for choosing among 
the local law of different jurisdictions”); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law 
Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 
173 (2004) (indicating that international law may have influenced the 
development of the service of process requirement). 
    
120 Now found, slightly amended, in 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2010). 
121 This distinction between ‘general’ and ‘local’ matters in Swift v. Tyson may 
itself implicitly recognize a primitive principle of subsidiarity, in acknowledging 
that some subject matters are more appropriately left to local regulation. 
122 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & 
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also MILLS, supra 
note 12, at 47, 127. 
123 See, e.g., Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 349 (1910) (“[W]here the 
law has not thus been settled it is the right and duty of the Federal court to 
exercise its own judgment, as it always does in cases depending on doctrines of 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
MILLS.DOC 1/13/2011 6:46 PM 
412 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:2 
The legacy of this ‘natural law’-inspired federal common law 
was thus that private law in this period was adjudged to be at least 
within the shared competence of federal and state authorities.  The 
Constitution was understood to have determined that federalized 
regulation of private law in diversity cases was at least possibly 
necessary as a matter of constitutional settlement.  The federal 
courts had decided to exercise this competence to develop federal 
law; the courts made a determination (as a matter of constitutional 
practice) that federal regulation was actually necessary and not 
precluded by the Rules of Decision Act.  Equally, states had their 
own common law, and state legislatures had the opportunity to 
pass statutes to regulate areas of private law and thus (ordinarily) 
override federal common law (but not, of course, any applicable 
federal statutes).124  An added complexity, however, was that 
federal common law was only applicable in federal courts 
exercising diversity jurisdiction, and in those circumstances federal 
and state courts could potentially have overlapping jurisdiction.  
This meant that in some cases a claimant would have (or would be 
able to engineer) a choice of venue, and thus would be able to 
‘forum shop’ between federal courts applying federal common law 
and state courts applying state law.125
 
commercial law and general jurisprudence.”); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ’g 
Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102 (1901) (“[T]he principles of the common law are operative 
upon all interstate commercial transactions except so far as they are modified by 
Congressional enactment”); Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 370 
(1893) (determining that the case was not a question of local law, but “rather one 
of general law, to be determined by a reference to all the authorities, and a 
consideration of . . . principles . . . .”). 
  To some extent this result 
was considered desirable—the competition from federal courts 
was thought likely to improve state courts and state law.  Concerns 
124 Federal courts did usually, but not invariably, apply state statutes as 
interpreted by state courts.  See generally Kirby v. Lake Shore & Michigan S. R.R. 
Co., 120 U.S. 130 (1887) (holding that a New York state statute would not affect 
the applicability of a similar and relevant federal statute); Burgess v. Seligman, 
107 U.S. 20 (1883) (declaring that the Court was not obliged to follow precedent 
set by the Supreme Court of Missouri in a similar case); Watson v. Tarpley, 59 U.S. 
517 (1855) (finding that a state statute preventing the filing of a suit for a specified 
amount of time would not hinder the ability of federal courts to hear the claim).  
125 See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab 
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928) (holding that federal courts with diversity 
jurisdiction are not required to apply state common law) rev’d by Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Marian O. Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial 
Precedent, 40 TEX. L. REV. 509, 510-11 (1962) (analyzing how Swift v. Tyson was not 
contained by the limits set by Justice Story and the ways in which this led to 
forum shopping). 
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about this behavior increased, however, as state courts and 
legislatures developed their own increasingly particular ‘”local” 
rules of private law, which might be thwarted through recourse to 
federal courts.126
4.1.2. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 
  
For this reason, the existence of general federal common law 
and its constitutional underpinnings were dramatically rejected by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.127  Erie 
instead held that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction 
would have to apply state common law, apparently assuming that 
this referred to the law of the state in which the court sits.128
There is no federal general common law.  Congress has no 
power to declare substantive rules of common law 
applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or 
“general,” be they commercial law or a part of the law of 
torts.  And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer 
such a power upon the federal courts.
  Justice 
Brandeis, delivering the opinion of the Court, famously held that: 
129





126 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 119, at 1293 (discussing the development of 
localized commercial doctrines which federal judges continued to disregard in 
favor of their own generalized commercial law).  
 drawing on new historical evidence of the original 
127 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  There was some 
indication of a trend in this direction, through increased deference to state law 
and its interpretation by state judges.  See, e.g., Willing v. Binenstock, 302 U.S. 272 
(1937) (giving deference to Pennsylvania’s law regarding partnership notes 
because nothing in the National Banking Act or in any federal statute conflicted 
with Pennsylvania’s rule); Marine Nat’l Exch. Bank of Milwaukee v. Kalt-
Zimmers Mfg. Co., 293 U.S. 357 (1934) (deferring to a Wisconsin statute after the 
Court distinguished the matter from other cases involving the application of a 
local decision).  See generally FREYER, supra note 114.  
128 See generally infra Part 4.2.  
129 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.  
130 See generally WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT 
OF 1789: EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 78–79 
(Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990) (questioning whether the Senate intended 
for Section 34 to be construed to perform “the functions that . . . the Supreme 
Court majority in Erie . . . have attributed to it); Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: 
Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 1421, 1424 (1989) (offering a “chronology of the origin of the federal courts 
within a socioeconomic context”); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the 
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 388 (1964); Teton, supra note 117, 
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intention of the drafters of the 1789 Judiciary Act to conclude that 
Congress intended to require federal courts to apply state common 
law.131  Whether this reinterpretation has discovered the “true” 
meaning of the statute remains, perhaps inevitably, a matter of 
contention.132  This continuing uncertainty only underlines the 
point that to characterize the decision technically in this way 
would be to miss its important theoretical and constitutional 
dimensions—the Court itself observed that “[i]f only a question of 
statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared 
to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a 
century.”133  The reinterpretation was based on a more 
fundamental move from Story’s “natural law”—inspired idea of 
common law134 to a positivist conception of law as the commands 
of a sovereign.135
Although perhaps motivated primarily by these changes in the 
conception of law, the Erie decision was also concerned with the 
proper constitutional balance between federal and state sources of 
legal authority.  This was not a case purely about judicial activism, 
but about federal judicial activism and its impact on the vertical 
balance of powers within the U.S. federal system.  In finding that 
the constitution did not support the judicial development of 
general federalized private law, the Court was giving effect to an 
  
 
at 536 (examining the Supreme Court’s construction of Section 34 and the ways in 
which this may have influenced the holding of Swift v. Tyson). 
131 The Court relied expressly on Charles Warren, New Light on the History of 
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923) (presenting a new 
perspective on the history of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 in the context of 
new material evidence). 
132 See generally Borchers, supra note 117; Clark, supra note 117 (questioning 
the post-Erie doctrine requiring federal courts to apply state substantive law). 
133 Erie, 304 U.S. at 77. 
134 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842) (holding that the decisions of judges are 
“at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not, of themselves, laws”).  
135 See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101–03 (1945) (noting that before 
Erie, “Law was conceived as a ‘brooding omnipresence’ of Reason, of which 
decisions were merely evidence, and not themselves the controlling 
formulations”); Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (stating that “law in the sense in which courts 
speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it”) 
(quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & 
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); Borchers, supra note 
117, at 116 (noting that the positivist conception of law “defined law as a 
command of a sovereign”).  But see Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the 
Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673 (1998) (challenging the 
conventional wisdom about the influence of legal positivism on Erie).   
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aspect of the principle of subsidiarity as a matter of constitutional 
settlement—its negative conception as a limitation on federal 
competence. 
Although not expressly part of the reasoning in Erie, a further 
part of the explanation for the decision arguably comes from the 
idea of ‘regulatory competition’ which has also recently influenced 
the debate on the federal distribution of competence in the 
European Union.136  This is the theory that a diversity of state laws 
contains the additional benefit that each state may act as a separate 
site for legal experimentation, with other states free to adopt the 
outcome which is best or most appropriate for their residents.137  It 
is perhaps significant that Justice Brandeis, who delivered the 
judgment in Erie, had previously written a dissenting judgment in 
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,138 dealing with the interpretation of 
constitutional Due Process,139 which included the statement that “it 
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.”140
 
136 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
  This idea of regulatory competition thus 
emphasizes the benefits of decentralization, providing a 
137 See generally ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009) 
(examining the nature and effects of competition between legal systems); George 
A. Bermann, Regulatory Federalism: European Union and United States, 263 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 9 (1997) (comparing the approaches to federal regulation in the 
European Union and United States in an effort to further understand the 
problems each faces); Horatia Muir Watt, Experiences from Europe: Legal Diversity 
and the Internal Market, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 429, 431 (2004) (examining “the rival 
claims of interjurisdictional competition as an alternative to central regulation”); 
Giesela Rühl, Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of Contracts: 
Transatlantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A 
GLOBALIZED WORLD 153 (Eckart Gottschalk et al. eds., 2007) (analyzing the 
development of party autonomy in conflict of laws from an economic 
perspective); Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in 
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 788 (1999) (arguing that 
regulators should allow “national legal systems to compete among themselves as 
to the terms they will offer commercial actors, and business people to choose 
among the competitors”). 
138 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
139 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law”).  
140 Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311; accord FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788 
(1982) (further arguing that “state innovation is no judicial myth”).  
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presumptive ‘centrifugal’ argument against federalized forms of 
regulation which must be overcome as part of any subsidiarity 
analysis.141  It may be contrasted with the idea of regulatory 
competition which operated (to little success142) under Swift v. 
Tyson, and which has recently been revived in the European 
Union143—the theory that federal law (and, in the United States, 
federal courts) could and should operate in competition with the 
states, as this will lead (by example) to the improvement and 
harmonization of state justice.144
It is striking that the decision in Erie came only a few months 
after standardized U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been 
adopted by the Supreme Court and sent to Congress for 
approval—as authorized under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934—
and less than six months before those rules were approved.
   
145  
Under the Process Act of 1789146
 
141 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 397 
(1997) (arguing that innovation beneficial to the entire populace may result from 
parallel state and sub-state governments serving as laboratories for 
experimentation). 
 and subsequent acts, federal 
courts were generally obliged to follow the procedural rules of the 
142 But see infra text accompanying note 235. 
143 See supra text accompanying notes 83–84 (discussing the proposed role of 
European contract law as an alternative system to that of the Member States, 
which private parties might choose to govern their contracts). 
144 The negative perception of state courts may have been influenced by the 
fact that Swift v. Tyson was decided in the midst of the famous ‘Caroline affair’, in 
which the arrest and trial of an English citizen in New York caused a major 
diplomatic incident between the United States and England, much criticism of the 
New York courts, and an exchange of letters which is still relied on as a precedent 
in the international law rules relating to the use of force by a state in self-defense. 
See The People v. McLeod, 1 Hill 377, 25 Wend. 483, 3 Hill 635 (N.Y., 1841); Teton, 
supra note 117, at 533–35 (discussing the Caroline incident and the resulting 
criticism of the New York Court for its alleged misapplication and 
misunderstanding of the law).  Similarly, modern federal common law is 
generally considered to be justified in areas in which U.S. foreign relations are 
implicated.  See infra note 179. 
145 Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2010)).  See also Orders Re Rules of Procedure, 302 
U.S. 783 (1937) (adopting the Rules of Procedure on Dec. 20, 1937, and requesting 
that the Attorney General report the Rules to Congress at the start of the next 
general session); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1015 (1982) (examining the history and context of the Rules Enabling Act); 
John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 718 (1974) 
(arguing that in determining the application of federal law, the Rules Enabling 
Act should be dispositive). 
146 Process Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 93, 1789.  For a discussion of the history of the 
Process Act, see Borchers, supra note 117, at 107. 
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state in which they were sitting.  As state procedural law was 
modernized in different states at different times, this resulted in 
federal courts following varied procedures in different common 
law cases.  Although the Conformity Act of 1872 introduced a 
more flexible obligation to “conform, as near as may be”147
That year thus saw two apparently diametrically opposed 
developments in federal courts:  first, the federalization of uniform 
rules of procedure, in response to difficulties caused by following 
diverse state procedural rules (including inconsistency between 
different federal courts); and, second, the decentralization of 
substantive rules, in response to difficulties caused by the adoption 
of federal common law (inconsistency between federal and state 
courts).
 to state 
procedures, the requirement to follow state procedural law 
essentially continued until federal procedural rules were finally 
adopted in 1938. 
148  These apparently conflicting trends are readily 
explained as an illustration of a subsidiarity-style ‘balancing’ of 
centrifugal and centripetal forces—as federal procedural power 
expanded (potentially increasing the danger of federal court forum 
shopping), federal substantive power contracted (counteracting 
this by aiming to eliminate state and federal court differences in 
substantive applicable law).  Between these two opposing 
movements, the boundary between substance and procedure was 
and remains inevitably a point of friction.  Cases in the years 
immediately after the decision in Erie largely took an expansive 
approach to what constitutes a ‘substantive’ rule, and therefore 
falls under state law,149
 
147 Conformity Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 196, 197, § 5 (1872). 
 although the procedural limits of Erie have 
148 See, e.g., Mary Kay Kane, The Golden Wedding Year: Erie Railroad Company 
v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 671 (1988) 
(recognizing the significance of 1938 as the year in which the Supreme Court both 
“return[ed] to the states the power to create common law” and “promulgate[d] 
the first set of federal civil rules”).  Kane notes, however, that Justice Brandeis, 
who delivered the opinion of the Court in Erie, did not approve of the adoption of 
federal procedural rules.  Id. at 673.  See also Orders Re Rules of Procedure, supra 
note 145, at 783 (noting Justice Brandeis’s disapproval). 
149 See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (establishing that state 
rules, not federal rules, should govern when the rules are “outcome 
determinative.”); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939) (determining 
state law regarding burden of proof in property dispute to be substantive and 
thus controlling).  But cf. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (holding that 
Rules 35 and 37, authorizing a federal court to order a party to undergo a physical 
or mental examination, are procedural not substantive, and therefore valid). 
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been the subject of continuing clarification, modification and 
rebalancing.150
The principle in Erie was quickly understood to apply not only 
to diversity cases, but also to incidental issues of private law which 
arise when a federal court has taken jurisdiction under other 
grounds—for example, mandating application of state property 
law to determine proprietary issues which may arise when 




150 See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431 (2010) (holding that where New York state law on class actions conflicted 
with the federal rule, Rule 23 governed and would allow suit despite state law 
position to the contrary); Gasperini v. Ctr for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) 
(allowing federal court to apply a lower state standard of review of jury’s verdict 
rather than the federal standard, so long as such application is consistent with the 
Seventh Amendment); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (applying federal 
rules of service of process in federal court, irrespective of whether the cause of 
action arose under state or federal law); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elect. Coop., 356 
U.S. 525 (1958) (holding that the federally-guaranteed right to a jury trial cannot 
be denied in federal court by virtue of a contrary state rule); Angel v. Bullington, 
330 U.S. 183 (1947) (applying res judicata to bar suit in federal court of alleged 
state court violation of federal Constitution, where such alleged violation was 
litigated in the state court system); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and 
Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 693 (1988) (examining federal limitations law); Donald L. Doernberg, The 
Unseen Track of Erie Railroad: Why History and Jurisprudence Suggest a More 
Straightforward Form of Erie Analysis, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 611 (2007) (discussing the 
history and application of the Erie doctrine as a governmental-interest analysis 
approach to a conflict of laws problem); Ely, supra note 145 (discussing the 
balance between substance and procedure under Erie); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The 
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 510 (1954) 
(discussing the frustrating effect of overlapping and conflicting systems of law 
and arguing the need for a harmonious federal/state system); Alfred Hill, The Erie 
Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 427 (Part I) and 541 (Part II) (1958) 
(analyzing the various problems that arise from application of the Erie doctrine); 
Kane, supra note 148 (discussing the Supreme Court’s position that it could 
prescribe procedural rules so long as it did not venture “into the prohibited 
bounds of substance left to state control”); Allen E. Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A 
Byrd’s-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TUL. L. REV. 443 (1962) 
(discussing the extent to which the Byrd decision has altered the Erie framework). 
  
151 See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 549 U.S. 
443, 443 (2007) (holding that contractual, and thus state law-governed, 
assessments of attorney fees may be applied in federal court, even in the course of 
litigating issues “peculiar to federal bankruptcy law”); Butner v. United States, 
440 U.S. 48 (1979) (determining that state law may control property rights in 
bankruptcy proceedings); see also Note, Interaction of National and State-Created 
Interests in Non-Diversity Fields, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1947) (discussing the 
implications of federal law built upon state-created interests); Laura E. Little, 
Empowerment through Restraint: Reverse Preemption or Hybrid Lawmaking?, 59 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. ___ (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1331588; infra note 244. 
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Despite this, it has been argued that another way of understanding 
the changes introduced in Erie is as a reinterpretation of the 
diversity jurisdiction function of the federal courts.  It is generally 
accepted that at least part of the reason for vesting federal courts 
with diversity jurisdiction was fear of bias in state courts against 
out of state litigants.152  In the early days of the U.S. federal system, 
federal courts were thus intended to serve the function of 
providing a neutral forum and (following Swift v. Tyson) neutral 
applicable law.  They were a check on state judiciaries, by offering 
an alternative law-making power in competition with state courts.  
The idea that diversity jurisdiction would protect litigants from 
state law is, however, at first glance somewhat difficult to reconcile 
with the disputed Rules of Decision Act.  Although it was a matter 
of disagreement whether this Act required federal courts to apply 
state common law, it has always been clear that it requires federal 
courts to apply state statutes.153
A probable explanation is that the development of 
discriminatory state statutes was intended to be restricted by the 
‘privileges and immunities’ clause in the Constitution, which 
provides that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”
  What is unclear is why state 
common law would be viewed as more problematic than state 




152 See Borchers, supra note 117, at 79 (recognizing a “consensus . . . that 
diversity [jurisdiction] has existed and exists to provide a neutral forum for out-
of-staters against perceived local bias by state courts”); Hill, supra note 150, at 451–
52 (“[I]t is the generally accepted view that the basic purpose of vesting in the 
federal courts jurisdiction to try controversies over questions of state law between 
citizens of different states was to permit the nonresident litigant to avoid possible 
bias in the local courts . . . .”).  But see Amar, supra note 20, at 1494 (arguing that 
the federalism envisioned by the Framers requires “each government checking the 
lawlessness of the other”); Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity 
Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483 (1928) (describing the roots of diversity 
jurisdiction—including arguments for and against it raised while drafting the 
Constitution—and casting doubt on the argument that states will be hostile to out-
of-state citizens); Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97 (1990) 
(providing an overview of historical arguments both for and against diversity 
jurisdiction, and arguing that Congress should abolish diversity jurisdiction—
with limited exceptions—to alleviate federal caseload).  
  
While there was some uncertainty as to the effect of this clause on 
state law-making powers, the Supreme Court finally clarified in 
153 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842). 
154 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
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1869 that the clause “inhibits discriminating legislation against 
[citizens of any State] by other States.”155  The Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, adopted in 1868 (also in the 
aftermath of the civil war), aimed to ensure even greater protection 
against state regulatory excess; establishing substantive federal 
constitutional rights in addition to the existing obligations of non-
discriminatory treatment.  It provides that “[n]o State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”156
By the twentieth century, the jurisdictional overlap between 
federal and state courts thus seemed less like an essential check on 
possible state bias, and more like an anachronistic fracturing of 
regulation, facilitating forum shopping.  As concerns about state 
courts and law have faded, so too has the need for federal courts to 
adopt federal common law as a neutral alternative to state law.  
This has lead to long-standing criticisms of the need for diversity 
jurisdiction to exist at all, particularly given the expanding 
demands on federal courts in exercising ‘federal question’ 
 
 
155 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1869), rev’d on other grounds United 
States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
156 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The effect of the prohibition on abridging 
“privileges or immunities” in this context is somewhat contested.  On the 
prevailing interpretation, it refers to privileges and immunities arising out of U.S. 
federal citizenship, rather than those arising out of state citizenship (which are 
covered by the “privileges and immunities” restriction in Article IV § 2), although 
on this reading it is potentially redundant (such privileges and immunities 
automatically override inconsistent state law because of the Due Process clause 
and/or Supremacy Clause).  See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (holding 
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause pertains to federal, not state, citizenship 
rights).  However, there are alternative interpretations of the meaning of 
“privileges or immunities.”  See William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, 
“Legislative History” and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1 (1954) (arguing that the clause should refer to rights arising out of state 
citizenship and defending the perspective on incorporation held by Justice Black; 
who would have incorporated the entire Bill of Rights); Charles Fairman, A Reply 
to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 144 (1954) (arguing against Justice Black’s 
stance); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1385, 1388 (1992) (distinguishing between equality-based protections and 
substantive protections to argue that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is an 
equality-based protection that imposes on any given state the requirement “that 
the law, whatever it is, be the same for all citizens”). 
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jurisdiction.157
4.1.3. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States 
  Even under Erie, of course, interstate litigants retain 
the possible benefit of federal courts as a neutral forum, as well as 
federal procedural rules, which may still address lingering 
concerns about bias in the application (rather than the form) of 
state rules.  Nevertheless, the post-Erie objective of achieving 
identity of decision with local state law is a far cry from the initial 
perceived purpose of diversity jurisdiction—neutrality and 
independence from state law. 
As is well known, federal common law has not been entirely 
abolished under these developments.  The recognition by the 
Supreme Court of special rules of federal common law began with 
an opinion delivered by Justice Brandeis the same day he delivered 
Erie,158 and may have already been implicit in Erie’s determination 
that “[t]here is no federal general common law.”159  In Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States,160
 
157 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 152 (arguing for the abolition of diversity 
jurisdiction). 
 the Supreme Court resurrected an 
element of federal common law jurisprudence (relating to 
government-issued commercial paper), and considered the criteria 
to be used in determining when federal courts could develop 
federal common law in the future.  Justice Douglas held, for the 
Court, that “the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins … does not apply to 
this action,” and that “[t]he rights and duties of the United States 
on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather 
158 See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 
110 (1938) (applying federal common law in relation to water rights). 
159 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added). 
160 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); see also Friendly, 
supra note 130, at 409 (discussing the spread of the Clearfield doctrine into other 
areas of litigation, including general contract law involving the validity of a 
liquidated damages clause); Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639, 1642 (2008) (“[I]t becomes clear that some form of 
Clearfield must govern all instances of preemptive federal common-law making.”); 
Clearfield:  Clouded Field of Federal Common Law, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1007 (1953) 
(“Clearfield may best be explained as a judicial attempt to avoid the expansion of 
the Rules of Decision Act occasioned by the Erie decision.”).  Various courts have 
addressed the scope of Clearfield.  See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 
451 U.S. 630 (1981) (looking to federal common law and finding no basis therein 
for the contribution claim alleged); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 
412 U.S. 580, 592 (1973) (finding that “[h]ere, the choice of law task is a federal 
task for federal courts, as defined by Clearfield”); United States v. Standard Oil Co. 
of Cal., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (applying federal common law in the antitrust context). 
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than local law.”161 Further, he concluded, “[i]n absence of an 
applicable Act of Congress, it is for the federal courts to fashion the 
governing rule of law according to their own standards.”162
The application of state law, even without the conflict of 
laws rules of the forum, would subject the rights and duties 
of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would 
lead to great diversity in results by making identical 
transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the 
several states. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain. 
And while the federal law merchant developed for about a 
century under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 
represented general commercial law rather than a choice of 
a federal rule designed to protect a federal right, it 
nevertheless stands as a convenient source of reference for 
fashioning federal rules applicable to these federal 
questions.
 The 
policy behind this qualification of Erie, and thus behind the re-
emergence of federal common law, was expressed in the following 
terms: 
163
This reasoning is instantly recognizable as a subsidiarity 
analysis, adopted as a guiding principle for judicial lawmaking, 
and operating as a matter of both constitutional settlement and 





161 Clearfield, 318 U.S. at 366. 
  The first stage asks whether federal (judicial) 
regulatory action is authorized under the Constitution—this is the 
question of whether federal action is permitted as a matter of 
constitutional settlement.  The second stage asks whether the 
adoption of a federal common law rule is ‘necessary’ to achieve 
objectives that could not be met by regulation according to the 
laws of different states—this is the question of whether federal 
action is justified as a matter of constitutional practice.  In Clearfield 
Trust, the Court concluded that “the desirability of a uniform rule” 
162 Id. at 367. 
163 Id. 
164 See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 881, 886, 950 (1986) (arguing “that no meaningful limits on judicial 
power to make federal common law have been articulated”); Lenaerts & Gutman, 
supra note 43, at 37 (providing further discussion of the two-prong test for 
determining whether an issue is governed by federal common law). 
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vindicated the adoption of federal rather than state law, which 
could be found in otherwise obsolescent federal common law 
jurisprudence. 165
Despite Erie, the Supreme Court has thus, in at least a category 
of circumstances, reserved to itself the power to make ongoing 
evaluations of the need for federal regulation of private law 
questions, drawing on the principle of subsidiarity.  Part of the 
explanation for this apparent inconsistency is a subtle shift in 
context, and thus in the role of the principle of subsidiarity.  
Subsidiarity operates in Erie purely as a matter of constitutional 
settlement: there can be no general federal common law because no 
constitutional power has authorized it.  In Clearfield Trust, 
however, it affects legal constitutional practice:  in an area properly 
within federal competence, it is for the courts to determine whether 
federal common law is justifiable. 
  
What ‘properly within federal competence’ means may, of 
course, be susceptible to different interpretations, although it must 
certainly be accepted that “[b]ecause post-Erie federal common law 
is made, not discovered, federal courts must possess some federal-
common-law-making authority before undertaking to craft it.”166  
Thus, some have argued that the Constitution permits a wide 
scope of federal common law, while others, by contrast, require 
specific constitutional or even legislative authorizations, 
suggesting that what is called ‘federal common law’ is really only 
(or mostly) legitimate if it is a matter of interpretation of federal 
statutes, rather than federal judicial lawmaking.167
 
165 Clearfield, 318 U.S. at 367. 
  Certainly, 
concerns about the separation of powers and the limits of the 
judicial function must play some role here, and the Supreme Court 
has on occasion preferred not to act on the basis that the relevant 
policy is “a proper subject for congressional action, not for any 
166 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 741 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
167 Compare Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 851 
(1989) (suggesting that federal common law should not be rejected due only to 
concerns over the limited power delegated to federal courts), with Martin H. 
Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An 
“Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 803 (1989) (“Nothing in 
American democratic theory . . . justifies the unrepresentative judiciary’s 
usurpation of the legislature’s basic policymaking function . . . .”), and Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327, 344 (1992) (noting that federal 
courts are not “general common-law courts” and that “there is a sense of unease 
about the decisions adopting federal common law, verging on guilt”). 
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creative power of ours.”168  When federal common law is ‘created,’ 
the reinterpretation of the federal judicial function discussed above 
suggests that it no longer serves the purpose (attributed to the old 
general common law) of providing an alternative (neutral) law to 
state law.169  It is thus now understood to be subject to the 
Supremacy Clause170 and hence also binding on state courts, 
thereby overcoming the concerns of forum shopping between 
federal and state courts that motivated Erie, and effectively 
harmonizing aspects of private law regulation within the federal 
system.171
Clearfield Trust is an excellent illustration of the fact that 
subsidiarity has a positive as well as a negative dimension—it can 
be used not merely as a presumption against federalized 
regulation, but as a way to articulate a justification in favor of it.  
This is the ”centripetal” aspect of subsidiarity, operating in support 
of federalized rules, countering the “centrifugal” pressures toward 
states’ rights acknowledged in Erie.  The revision to the 
  Again, this may be understood as a process of federal 
rebalancing—as the scope of federal power has contracted (there is 
no general federal common law), its effectiveness has expanded 
(modern federal common law is binding on state courts). 
 
168 United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 314 (1947); see also 
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (holding that Congress had 
“occupied the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory 
program,” displacing federal common law). 
169 But see Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 
100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 588 (2006) (“[P]otential bias in creating state law is a 
necessary condition for creating federal common law.”). 
170 See supra note 27 (discussing clarifications of the clause).  
171 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964) 
(“[T]here are enclaves of federal judge-made law which bind the States.”); Clark, 
supra note 117, at 1268 (noting that under the Supremacy Clause, federal common 
law is binding in both state and federal forums); Field, supra note 164, at 897 
(“[F]ederal common law rule, once made, has precisely the same force and effect 
as any other federal rule.  It is binding on state court judges through the 
supremacy clause.”); Friendly, supra note 130, at 405 (“Erie led to the emergence of 
a federal decisional law in areas of national concern that is truly uniform because, 
under the supremacy clause, it is binding in every forum . . . .”); Alfred Hill, The 
Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 
1024, 1074 (1967) (observing that federal judge-made law is binding upon the 
states under the Supremacy Clause).  Applying federal common law is of course 
not a purely mechanical process; it has thus also been argued that “[i]t is not the 
case . . . that state courts merely follow federal common law that the Supreme 
Court has made; rather, state courts regularly participate in the development of 
federal common law themselves—in other words, they make federal common law 
too.”  Bellia, State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, supra note 119, at 
828 (discussing what justifies the creation of federal common law by state courts). 
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constitutional balance in Erie is, on this view, counter-balanced by 
Clearfield Trust’s introduction of subsidiarity in private law as a 
matter of constitutional practice, to replace Erie’s apparent 
determination that private law is ruled out as a matter of 
constitutional settlement.  As Judge Friendly of the federal court 
suggested, “the Hegelian dialectic has been here at work—with 
Swift v. Tyson the thesis, Erie the antithesis, and the new federal 
common law the synthesis.”172  The status of private law in federal 
courts moves from (pre-Erie) federal common law, to (Erie) 
apparently exclusively state law, to (Clearfield Trust) a matter of 
(contentiously) shared federal and state competence, with the 
boundary to be determined by application of subsidiarity 
principles.  Rightly interpreted by Clearfield Trust, the decision in 
Erie turns out not to be a centrifugal principle of “states’ rights,” 
but the adoption of a principle and a decisional process of 
subsidiarity, aspiring toward the harmonious and balanced 
Newtonian solar system envisaged by the Constitution.173  It 
provides simply that, as stated by Judge Dobie of the federal court 
in a lecture of 1941, “[u]nto each Caesar, State or federal, is thus 
rendered that which properly belongs to that particular Caesar, 
supreme in its distinctive field.”174
Drawing on the subsidiarity principle adopted in Clearfield 
Trust, the Supreme Court has developed rules of federal common 
law in a range of areas in which federal competence exists, and the 
issues are “so vitally affecting interests, powers and relations of the 
Federal Government as to require uniform national disposition 
rather than diversified state rulings,”
 
175 which “relate to programs 
and actions which by their nature are and must be uniform in 
character throughout the Nation,”176 or where “uniquely federal 
interests” are at stake.177
 
172 Friendly, supra note 130, at 421 (arguing that since Erie the U.S. Supreme 
Court “has been forging a new centripetal tool incalculably useful to our federal 
system”). 
  This analysis has not only been applied in 
173 See Amar, supra note 20, at 1449 (comparing the relationship between state 
and federal law laid out in the Constitution to a “harmonious Newtonian solar 
system,” in which states are distinct spheres of law controlled by the 
“gravitational force of a common central body”). 
174 Friendly, supra note 130, at 407–08 (citation omitted). 
175 United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947). 
176 United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354 (1966). 
177 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964); see also 
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (noting that 
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diversity cases, but also where Erie has been extended to other 
grounds of federal jurisdiction.  Thus, for example, the Supreme 
Court has held that state law should ordinarily determine property 
rights in bankruptcy proceedings, “[u]nless some federal interest 
requires a different result.”178  In some cases the exclusivity of 
federal interest is expressly determined by the Constitution, as a 
matter of constitutional settlement, such as the federal interest in 
regulating the foreign relations of the United States, which 
includes a limited but contested role for the courts.179
 
federal interest in certain areas, such as claim preclusion, may warrant the 
creation of rules contrary to state law); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 
504 (1988) (“[A] few areas, involving ‘uniquely federal interests,’ . . . are so 
committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control 
that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a 
content prescribed . . . by the courts . . . .”) (citation omitted); Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 400 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that “federal courts . . . have the power to award 
damages for violation of ‘constitutionally protected interests’”); D’Oench, Duhme 
& Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 457 (1942) (arguing that the Federal Reserve Act 
created a federal interest in protecting the FDIC and is subject to federal law).  See 
generally George D. Brown, Federal Common Law and the Role of the Federal Courts in 
Private Law Adjudication—A (New) Erie Problem?, 12 PACE L. REV. 229, 231–32 
(1992) (noting that federal common law’s application to “uniquely federal 
interests” should be  separate from Federal judges’ statutory or constitutional 
interpretation) (citation omitted); Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 
Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. 
REV. 733, 758 (1986) (discussing how state law governs in federal cases, unless the 
state’s law is inconsistent with federal interests); Field, supra note 164, at 885–86 
(describing a two-prong test, which includes asking whether it is proper to apply 
federal power to the issue at hand and whether it is appropriate to favor federal 
law in light of the competing state’s interest, to determine if federal common law 
is necessary); Friendly, supra note 130, at 405 (discussing Erie’s role in allowing for 
a binding, uniform federal decisional law in areas of national concern); Hill, supra 
note 171, at 1035-46 (discussing the role of federal interest in cases regarding 
federal law to which the United States is not a party); Larry Kramer, The 
Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 301 (1992) (arguing that 
federalism requires federal common law to be limited to filling in federal interest 
gaps left by Congressional statutes); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers 
of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 18 (1985) (analyzing the role of federalism in 
granting the judiciary branch certain “implied powers” in areas of federal 
interest); Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 169, at 630–32 (advancing the role 
federal interests and federal common law play in providing neutral solutions to 
cases in which the United States is a party and in disputes between two or more 
states); Young, supra note 160, at 1661 (discussing doctrinal problems with the 
idea that “federal interest” can be entirely separated from state interests so as to 
warrant federal common law). 
  In this 
178 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
179 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (reaffirming 
that “the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations” and 
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context, the fractured post-Erie judicial development of federal 
rules of private law in the United States in subjects of particular 
federal interest and competence mirrors the fragmented 
development of European private law, as an incidental effect of the 
constitutional authorization of federal regulation in particular 
subject matters.180  In other cases, such as the apparent application 
of ‘general contract law’ to federal government contracts,181
 
characterizing customary international law as “federal common law” for purposes 
of the Alien Tort Statute); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 396 (2003) 
(holding that state law is preempted by national policies when it conflicts with 
foreign relations policies); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (arguing 
that even in the absence of a specific treaty or statute preempting a state’s law, 
only federal policies may directly impact foreign relations); Banco Nacional de 
Cuba, 376 U.S. at 425 (“[A]n issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the 
competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering 
our relationships with other members of the international community must be 
treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.”); Bellia & Clark, supra note 119, at 
8 (arguing that the Constitution was framed, in part, in order to grant the federal 
courts and federal government exclusive jurisdiction over foreign relations); 
Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing 
Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 902 (2007) (stating that, contrary to many 
scholar’s views, Sosa did not automatically make all of customary international 
law a part of federal common law and that judges should look for legislative 
guidance before exercising their authority); William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: 
Customary International Law in the U.S. Legal System after Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 87, 88 (2004) (arguing that Sosa has a narrow effect on 
the role of customary international law in the United States and courts must 
continue to review similar cases issue by issue); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, 
Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1636 (1997) (arguing that the 
federal common law of foreign relations is unjustified); Hill, supra note 171, at 
1042 (noting that “an area of federal judicial competence by force of a preemption 
effected by the Constitution is one involving questions of international law”); 
Philip C. Jessup, Editorial Comment, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 
Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740, 743 (1939) (“[A]ny attempt to 
extend the doctrine of the Tompkins case to international law should be 
repudiated by the Supreme Court . . . . Any question of applying international law 
in our courts involves the foreign relations of the United States and can thus be 
brought within a federal power.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is 
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1827 (1998) (arguing 
that the incorporation of international law into federal common law is 
constitutional, in response to Curtis Bradley’s and Jack Goldsmith’s critique of the 
federalization of customary international law without explicit authority from 
other political branches). 
 the 
180 See supra Part 3.1. 
181 See, e.g., Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947) (“It is 
customary, where Congress has not adopted a different standard, to apply to the 
construction of government contracts the principles of general contract law.”); 
United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944) (“The validity and 
construction of contracts through which the United States is exercising its 
constitutional functions, their consequences on the rights and obligations of the 
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justification for federal common law appears to be based on a 
determination by the courts themselves, as a matter of 
constitutional practice.  It has also been argued that some federal 
common law has been derived from the ‘structure’ of the federal 
system.182
These justifications for centralization are, however, balanced by 
the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the other, centrifugal aspect of 
subsidiarity.  Thus, it has held that “a court should endeavor to fill 
the interstices of federal remedial schemes with uniform federal 
rules only when the scheme in question evidences a distinct need 
for nationwide legal standards.”
 
183  Similarly, the Court has 
determined that state interests “should be overridden by the 
federal courts only where clear and substantial interests of the 
National Government, which cannot be served consistently with 
respect for such state interests, will suffer major damage if the state 
law is applied,”184 and thus that a particular policy objective 
should not be addressed by federal common law if “there has been 
no showing that state law is not adequate to achieve it.”185
The emergence of other mechanisms for coordinating state law 
in areas of national concern, such as the various projects under the 




parties, the titles or liens which they create or permit, all present questions of 
federal law not controlled by the law of any State.”). 
 and the American 
182 See Clark, supra note 119, at 1271 (observing that a legitimate federal 
common law rule is one that is beyond the legislative capabilities of state law and 
relates to a constitutional issue). 
183 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991). 
184 United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). 
185 Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 71 (1966); see also 
Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (noting that judges must first 
demonstrate a significant conflict between federal policy and a relevant state law 
before applying federal common law); O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 
89 (1994) (“We conclude that this is not one of those extraordinary cases in which 
the judicial creation of a federal rule of decision is warranted.”); Tex. Indus. v. 
Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (“[A]bsent some congressional 
authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision, federal common law 
exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and 
obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating 
the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty 
cases.”); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727–28 (1979) 
(“Controversies directly affecting the operations of federal programs, although 
governed by federal law, do not inevitably require resort to uniform federal 
rules.”). 
186 Formally the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws.  See THE NAT’L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. LAWS, 
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Law Institute,187 thus also operates as a counter-weight to the need 
to develop federal common (or statutory) law.  This is particularly 
evident in their joint publication of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
which was expressly adopted in preference to a proposed Federal 
Sales Act,188 but is also present in a range of modern efforts toward 
cooperative solutions that cut across federal-state boundaries.189  
As in the European Union,190 these forms of ‘bottom-up’ 
harmonization, where commonalities between states are identified 
and encouraged rather than imposed, may be viewed as naturally 
more consistent with subsidiarity than the ‘top-down’ adoption of 
binding federal rules.  If this type of harmonization is not 
attempted it is difficult to demonstrate that “state law is not 
adequate to achieve”191
 
www.nccusl.org (last visited Nov. 23, 2010) (providing information about the 
Commission and electronic copies of non-partisan rules and procedures the 
Commission has drafted); Allison Dunham, A History of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 237 (1965) 
(noting that states could voluntarily adopt the Commission's laws to obtain 
national uniformity). 
 the objectives sought by federal regulation.  
Uniform law projects may thus be conceptualized as the practical 
testing ground of subsidiarity in the federal division of powers, 
187 See THE AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org (last visited Nov. 23, 2010) 
(describing the Institute’s work to debate and draft uniform model laws, 
Restatements of Law, and principles of law across a number of areas). 
188 See, e.g., Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 799 (1958) (surveying the legislative history of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, which the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws proposed to replace Congress’s Federal Sales Act in 1940); 
Lenaerts & Gutman, supra note 43, at 66 (describing the American Law Institute’s 
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws’ joint 
promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code).  But see William Tucker Dean, 
Jr., Conflict of Laws under the Uniform Commercial Code: The Case for Federal 
Enactment, 6 VAND. L. REV. 479, 479–80 (1953) (discussing how piecemeal 
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code will result in greater conflict of laws 
between U.S. jurisdictions). 
189 See, e.g., A. Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. 
L. REV. 297, 299-300 (2003) (examining new methods in commercial lawmaking 
which allow for partial federal control in areas of state law, instead of the 
traditional all-or-nothing rule of strict federal preemption). 
190 See supra text accompanying note 76 (noting the difficulty of creating 
vertical harmonization in the European Union without first allowing for the 
possibility of horizontal state cooperation). 
191 Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 71 (1966). 
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addressing its speculative nature192
It is striking that the invocation of the centrifugal dimension of 
subsidiarity in Erie itself marked a retreat from a perceived 
excessive centralization of regulation—a reaction to the growth in 
federal authority under Roosevelt’s New Deal.
 by determining experimentally 
whether problems can be solved without federal intervention. 
193  This growth was 
based at least in part on a broad judicial interpretation of Article I 
of the Constitution, Section 8, Clause 18,194 as well as a newly 
expansive approach to the Commerce Clause.195  The development 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (first published in 1952) may be 
viewed as part of the same reaction—an attempt to forestall federal 
exercise of these newly expanded commerce powers.  An 
instructive parallel may be drawn with the rise of subsidiarity in 
the European Union in the early 1990s, examined above, which 
came in conjunction with—and in an attempt to mitigate the effects 
of—expanding European Community powers.196  It is perhaps also 
striking that the rebalancing counter-reaction in Clearfield Trust 
came during U.S. involvement in the Second World War—in which 
the national interest arguably justified greater centralization197—
and ironic that Clearfield Trust itself arose out of a fraudulently 
presented $24.20 paycheck from the Works Progress 
Administration, the largest New Deal agency.198
 
192 See supra text accompanying note 32 (noting the counterfactual nature of 
subsidiarity inquiries).  
  
193 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987) (discussing the impact and legacy of the New Deal). 
194 See supra Part 2.2. 
195 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. 1 (1937) (finding that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to pass 
legislation that punished businesses in interstate commerce for refusing to 
negotiate with unions); infra note 206 and accompanying text (pertaining to 
subsidiarity-style reasoning in interpreting the scope of the Commerce Clause). 
196 See supra Part 3.1.1. 
197 Note also the contemporaneous expansive interpretations of the 
Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (finding the 
Commerce Clause to encompass the power to regulate the growth of wheat for 
private use because reducing a potential consumer’s need to purchase wheat from 
the market affected interstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 
(1941) (upholding the constitutionality of legislation regulating employment 
conditions). 
198 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 364 (1943). 
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4.1.4. Subsidiarity as a Principle of U.S. Federalism? 
Subsidiarity has venerable origins in U.S. political thought, 
particularly in Abraham Lincoln’s often quoted observation that 
“[t]he legitimate object of government, is to do for a community of 
people, whatever they need to have done, but can not do, at all, or 
can not, so well do, for themselves—in their separate, and 
individual capacities.”199  Nevertheless, it has typically been 
viewed as playing only a very limited role in the U.S. federal 
system, and then only as a political rather than a legal principle.200
[A] system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate 
interests of both State and National Governments, and in 
which the National Government, anxious though it may be 
to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, 
always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly 
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
  
The federal government is generally considered (by the courts, at 
least) as acting legitimately if it exercises any power granted to it 
under the Constitution, whether or not the objectives of its actions 
could equally be achieved by state regulation.  Ideas of subsidiarity 
(as a matter of general federal balancing) do have influence when it 
comes to resolving what powers are actually granted to federal 
authorities—thus, the Supreme Court has committed itself to 
protect: 
201
But there is certainly no express constitutional provision, 
equivalent to the European principle of subsidiarity, which 
imposes legal restraint on the Federal government’s exercise of 
powers shared with the states.  Thus, as a legal principle, 
   
 
199 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, To Do for the People What Needs to be Done, in LINCOLN 
ON DEMOCRACY (Mario M. Cuomo & Harold Holzer eds. 1990); see, e.g., Vischer, 
supra note 9, at 126 (arguing that subsidiarity “is deeply ingrained in the structure 
of our federal system”). 
200 See Bermann, supra note 14, at 407–23 (discussing the extent to which 
Congress may or may not contemplate the need for federal rather than state 
legislation when it acts or, separately, the constitutionality of such action).  See 
generally George A. Bermann, Subsidiarity as a Principle of U.S. Constitutional Law, 
42 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPPLEMENT 555 (1994) (arguing that while subsidiarity does not 
find much judicial or constitutional support in the United States, legislative and 
executive actors ultimately promote the same principles subsidiarity seeks to 
serve).  
201 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).  But cf. Friedman, supra note 141, 
at 318 (suggesting that there is “little real effort . . . to take account of when 
governmental power sensibly is exercised at one level or another”). 
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subsidiarity in the United States is largely only present implicitly 
in the division of constitutional powers—in the allocation of some 
powers exclusively to the states, some exclusively to the federal 
government, and some shared between both, as a hard-wired 
matter of constitutional settlement. 
Federal courts have, however, adopted reasoning which 
supports a subsidiarity-style analysis in other contexts, in addition 
to its role in the development of federal common law explored 
above.  For example, in interpreting choice of court clauses which 
might affect diversity jurisdiction, federal courts have 
predominantly applied federal standards rather than state contract 
law, because of “the possibility of diverging state and federal law 
on an issue of great economic consequence, the risk of inconsistent 
decisions in diversity cases, and the strong federal interest in 
procedural matters in federal court.”202  Subsidiarity considerations 
have also affected the Supreme Court’s determination of whether 
federal regulation is compatible with supplementary state 
regulation, or whether (following the Supremacy Clause) it 
preempts state law.  Thus, one justification for preemption is that 
an “[a]ct of Congress may touch a field in which the federal 
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to 
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”203  As a 
counter-weight to this, the Supreme Court has also recognized 
(although perhaps not always consistently applied) a presumption 
against preemption,204
 
202 Wong v. Party Gaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting, 
however, a split in other Circuit authorities on the point). 
 and thus a constitutional preference for the 
‘hybridized’ coexistence of federal and state law rather than the 
203 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Wis. Pub. 
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991) (stating that absent pre-emptive 
language, Congressional intent to supersede state law may still be implicit where 
the federal interest is dominant); Bermann, supra note 14, at 424 (“Federal pre-
emption is one way in which Congress shows its preference for federal over state 
regulation of a given matter”).  See generally Young, supra note 160 (discussing 
Clearfield Trust Co. and the application of federal, rather than state, law in antitrust 
cases); Roderick M. Hills, Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the 
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007) (arguing that federal and 
state regulatory powers necessarily overlap, and that the states’ political processes 
protect national values). 
204 See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187; accord Altria Grp. v. Good, 
129 S. Ct. 538 (2008); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
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displacement of state law by federal—“a blend of legal rules with 
alternating strata of state and federal principles.”205
Perhaps the most important field in which subsidiarity-style 
reasoning may be readily (although again somewhat 
intermittently) identified is in the case law dealing with the 
interpretation of the scope of the Commerce Clause,
 
206 which has 
(inter alia) been the source of much of the fragmented federal 
statutory rules dealing with private law207—mirroring the 
fragmented post-Erie judicial development of federal private law.  
Although this is formally a matter of interpretation of the 
constitutional settlement, in practice the courts have at times 
openly engaged with the policy question of the appropriateness of 
the division of federal and state powers.208
[T]he power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, 
containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, 
quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding 
a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of 
the United States in every port; and some . . . imperatively 
demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local 
necessities of navigation.
  In 1852, the Supreme 
Court held that the content of the Commerce Clause depended on 
the strength of the justification for uniform regulation, observing 
that: 
209
The Court thus adopted a subsidiarity-style balancing test, 
determining the validity of a particular exercise of the Commerce 
 
 
205 Little, supra note 151, at 28. 
206 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Bermann, supra note 14, at 417 (concluding 
that the Supreme Court has declined to read the Commerce Clause as a basis for 
enforcing subsidiarity on Congress, opting instead to use the Tenth Amendment 
to avoid the federalism question posed by subsidiarity); Edwards, supra note 57, at 
566–68 (discussing the effects of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
congressional power on integral state functions).  See generally Vause, supra note 
63 (reviewing American federalism and subsidiarity principles). 
207 The Federal Trade Commission, for example, enforces a range of federal 
consumer protection statutes.  See generally Legal Resources—Statutes Relating to 
Consumer Protection Mission, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 7, 2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/stat3.shtm (listing such statutes); Federal Trade 
Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2010) (establishing the Federal Trade 
Commission). 
208 See supra Part 2.2.  
209 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1852). 
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Clause based on analysis of whether federal regulation was 
necessary to achieve the desired policy objectives. 
Although this approach has not always played a major role in 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the Court returned to it in Fry 
v. United States, finding that the relevant statute, “an emergency 
measure to counter severe inflation that threatened the national 
economy,” must be held valid otherwise “the effectiveness of 
federal action would have been drastically impaired.”210  In 
National League of Cities v. Usery, the Court distinguished Fry on the 
basis that “[t]he enactment at issue there was occasioned by an 
extremely serious problem which endangered the well-being of all 
the component parts of our federal system and which only 
collective action by the National Government might forestall.”211  
The Court thus held, relying on the Tenth Amendment, that 
“integral operations in areas of traditional [state] governmental 
functions”212 should be shielded from federal regulation.  Justice 
Blackmun, concurring, considered that the majority opinion 
“adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw federal power 
in areas such as environmental protection, where the federal 
interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility 
compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential.”213
The approach in these cases was, however, expressly overruled 
in Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Authority,
 
214 where the Court (with 
Justice Blackmun writing the majority opinion, in an 
acknowledged volte-face) held that “State sovereign interests . . . are 
more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the 
structure of the federal system than by judicially created 
limitations on federal power.”215
 
210 Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975). 
  A parallel may be drawn here 
with the E.U. debate about the substantive or procedural character 
211 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976). 
212 Id. at 852. 
213 Id. at 856. 
214 See Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) 
(“[W]ithin the realm of authority left open to them under the Constitution, the 
States must be equally free to engage in any activity that their citizens choose for 
the common weal, no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else—
including the judiciary—deems state involvement to be.”). 
215 Id. at 552; see, e.g., Bermann, supra note 14, at 407 (“[A] series of executive 
orders calls upon the federal agencies not only to minimize the regulatory 
burdens imposed on the private sector, but also to refrain from regulating at all if 
action at the state or local level would satisfactorily accomplish the federal 
government’s objectives.”). 
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of subsidiarity—whether it is or should be justiciable and thereby 
judicially enforced, or whether Member State interests are 
sufficiently protected as a matter of European legislative 
procedure.216  The Supreme Court in Garcia preferred a procedural 
approach, emphasizing the protection of state interests through 
participation in Congress, because of concerns over whether the 
courts can or should evaluate the necessity or the appropriateness 
of the exercise of federal power.  Rather than engage in a 
subsidiarity analysis to determine the scope of application of the 
Commerce Clause on a case-by-case basis, the Supreme Court has 
subsequently controlled its exercise simply by construing the 
clause (and the ‘necessary and proper’ clause) more narrowly,217 
although the most recent cases perhaps suggest a re-widening of 
federal authority.218  This ongoing indeterminacy has led to critical 
calls for the express (re)adoption of subsidiarity as “a more 
effective and fluid balance of power between state and federal 
governments,”219
 
216 See supra text accompanying note 69. 
 providing a methodology for the explicit analysis 
of policy questions involving the federal distribution of power, 
rather than the present focus on the implicit determination of such 
questions through constitutional interpretation. 
217 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 because it exceeded congress’s power under the 
commerce clause); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) 
(“[T]hus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause 
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.”).  
But see Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In 
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995) (arguing that the Lopez 
court’s decision “to invalidate an Act of Congress on the ground that it exceeded 
the commerce power must be recognized as an extraordinary event”). 
218 See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949 (2010) (holding that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause has an expansive effect on the scope of the 
enumerated powers, including the Commerce Clause); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1, 35 (2005) (“Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate 
commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do 
not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.”). 
219 Jared Bayer, Comment, Re-Balancing State and Federal Power: Toward a 
Political Principle of Subsidiarity in the United States, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1421, 1425 
(2003–2004); see also Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 795 (1996) (discussing the role of subsidiarity within federalism, and 
how inter-jurisdictional deference allows for effective legislation). 
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4.2. Subsidiarity and the Conflict of Laws 
In the early history of U.S. law, federal conflict of laws rules 
were developed as part of federal common law.  Initially this was 
influenced by an internationalist perspective on conflict of laws 
(commonly known at the time, and still known in the European 
Union, as ‘private international law’), which was considered as 
part of a broadly conceived international law.220  The development 
of federal conflict of laws was thus an aspect of the way that rules 
of federal common law drew on ideas of a universal (natural law 
inspired) ‘lex mercatoria’.221  As the conflict of laws became 
reconceived as national law through the nineteenth century, and 
the justification for federal common law lost its international 
dimension, federal conflicts rules nevertheless continued to 
develop, coming increasingly under the influence of the 
constitutional obligations of Full Faith and Credit222 and Due 
Process.223
 
220 See, e.g., Suydam v. Broadnax, 39 U.S. 67, 67 (1840) (holding that one state 
cannot discharge a debt from a contract entered into in another state because of 
the general assumption that contracts are governed by the laws under which they 
are created); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 222 (1827) (“The constitution meant 
to preserve the inviolability of contracts, as secured by those eternal principles of 
equity and justice which run throughout every civilized code, which form a part 
of the law of nature and nations, and by which human society, in all countries and 
all ages, has been regulated and upheld”); MILLS, supra note 12, at 127.   
  In 1926, it was suggested that the “Supreme Court has 
quite definitely committed itself to a program of making itself, to 
some extent, a tribunal for bringing about uniformity in the field of 
221 See supra note 119 (discussing federal courts’ use of the lex mercatoria); 
MILLS, supra note 12, Ch. 2 (discussing natural law and positve approaches to 
conflict of laws); see also Bruce Wardhaugh, From Natural Law to Legal Realism: 
Legal Philosophy, Legal Theory, and the Development of American Conflict of Laws since 
1830, 41 ME. L. REV. 307 (1989) (“[T]he revolution [in American conflict of laws] 
can be correlated with a change in the manner in which both law and legal 
reasoning have come to be viewed by members of the legal profession in the 
twentieth century.”). 
222 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State 
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And the 
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records 
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”); see, e.g., Bradford Elec. 
Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) (holding that the full faith and credit 
clause required a federal court sitting in New Hampshire to apply the Vermont 
workers' compensation statute in a suit brought by the administrator of a 
Vermont worker who was killed in New Hampshire). 
223  Supra note 139. 
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conflicts,”224 on the basis that “the full faith and credit clause . . . 
impose[s] on a state court the duty, in framing its local rule, to 
follow the statute of another state where, in the opinion of the 
Supreme Court, the demands of justice require that such a course 
be adopted.”225  The conflict of laws was understood to be 
concerned with “the powers of independent and ‘sovereign’ states 
and the limitations which result from their uniting in the Federal 
Compact,”226 acting “to coordinate the administration of justice 
among the several independent legal systems which exist in our 
Federation,”227 a description that can readily be applied to the 
modern E.U. conception of the conflict of laws, explored above.228
In 1931, the title of one law review article quite reasonably 
asked: “Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of 
Constitutional Law?”
 
229  A few years later in 1934, the First 
Restatement on the Conflict of Laws, drafted by Professor Joseph 
Beale, attempted to codify nationally uniform rules of conflict of 
laws.  In Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission 
of California,230 the Supreme Court held that “it is unavoidable that 
this Court determine for itself the extent to which the statute of one 
state may qualify or deny rights asserted under the statute of 
another,” suggesting that the methodology for doing this should 
involve “appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction 
and turning the scale of decision according to their weight.”231  In 
Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.,232
 
224  E. Merick Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in 
the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 HARV. L. REV. 533, 560 (1926).  
 federal choice of 
law rules were found to be necessary so “that inequalities and 
225 Id. at 544. 
226 Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the 
Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1945); see also Milwaukee v. M.E. White, 296 
U.S. 268, 276–7 (1935) (“The very purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to 
alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties . . . and 
to make them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy upon a 
just obligation might be demanded as of right . . . .”). 
227 Jackson, supra note 226, at 2. 
228 See supra Part 3.2. 
229 G.W.C. Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?, 
15 MINN. L. REV. 161 (1930). 
230 Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Industrial Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 
547 (1935). 
231 Id. at 547.  
232 Boseman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196, 196 (1937). 
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confusion liable to result from applications of diverse state laws 
shall be avoided.”233
Just as with private law during this period, the constitution 
was understood to have determined that federalized choice of law 
rules were at least possibly necessary (as a matter of constitutional 
settlement), and the federal courts exercised this competence to 
impose federal law, making a determination (as a matter of 
constitutional practice) that federal regulation was actually 
necessary.  Indeed, federal conflict of laws rules appeared to be a 
shining example of the theory of Swift v. Tyson in successful 
application—in developing conflict of laws rules, federal courts 
were leading the way toward a coalescing of state and federal 
court rules and techniques.
 
234
The Supreme Court initially appeared to assume that Erie did 
not affect the existence of federal rules governing the conflict of 
laws.  Without discussing state choice of law rules, it held in 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc.,
  This approach was, however, 
rejected alongside the rejection of general federal common law in 
Erie, and the discipline of conflict of laws moved dramatically 
away from this high watermark of historical federalization. 
235 a personal injury case, that “the 
Rules of Decision Act required the [federal] District Court, though 
sitting in Illinois, to apply the law of Indiana, the state where the 
cause of action arose”.236  However, within six months of Sibbach 
the effect of Erie was in fact extended to the conflict of laws 
through the (much criticized)237 decision in Klaxon v. Stentor 
Electric,238
 
233 Id. at 206.  
 which held that:   
234 See supra text accompanying note 144 (discussing the theory that Swift v. 
Tyson would lead to improvements in state justice).  
235 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
236 Id. at 10–11. 
237 See Baxter, supra note 114, at 32 (suggesting that Klaxon was decided 
“without making the most cursory reference to the language, history, or purpose 
of the Rules of Decision Act or the grant of diversity jurisdiction or to the history 
or purpose of the federal courts in general”); Borchers, supra note 117 (arguing 
that the court in Klaxon was incorrect in holding that federal courts must apply 
state choice of law rules); Cook, supra note 114, at 517 (“[T]he condemnation of the 
‘doctrine of Swift v. Tyson’ as an unconstitutional usurpation of power by the 
federal courts, including the Supreme Court itself, cannot be extended to their 
conduct in deciding cases in the conflict of laws . . . .”); Michael H. Gottesman, 
Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 
1 (1991) (arguing that Congress should enact federal choice of law rules for 
categories of disputes that frequently arise in multistate contexts); Hill, supra note 
150 at 456 (criticizing Klaxon because the Supreme Court held that the court 
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[T]he prohibition declared in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . 
extends to the field of conflict of laws.  The conflict of laws 
rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must 
conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts . . . .  
Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between 
federal courts in different states is attributable to our 
federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits 
permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local 
policies diverging from those of its neighbors.  It is not for 
the federal courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing 
an independent “general law” of conflict of laws.239
 The Supreme Court is here clearly, albeit implicitly, invoking 
subsidiarity as a question of constitutional settlement, as operative 
in Erie—the Constitution is interpreted as having made the 
determination that federal choice of law rules, at least in this 
context, are unjustified.  The effect of Klaxon is that federal courts 
exercising diversity jurisdiction must generally apply, first, state 
choice of law rules (specifically, those of the state in which the 
federal court is sitting), and then, second, state substantive law 
(specifically, the law selected by those choice of law rules, to the 
extent that they designate the law of another state,
   
240
 
should have applied the law of Delaware if the state courts in Delaware would 
have done so, yet the court below found that Delaware was lacking any contact 
with the controversy which would justify application of Delaware law and this 
finding was not disputed); Jackson, supra note 226 (outlining the historical 
development of conflict of laws doctrine regarding conflicting state laws and 
arguing that integration of laws on a national level is a better solution than the 
current method of choosing the applicable law); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith 
and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A Historical-Analytical Approach, 56 MICH. L. 
REV. 33, 81 (1957) (arguing that Klaxon “has halted development of a national 
conflicts law by the federal courts”); see also Laycock, supra note 119 (stating that 
the requirement to follow another state’s choice of law rules undermines the 
reasoning behind diversity jurisdiction because it creates the same type of 
discrimination which diversity jurisdiction seeks to avoid). 
 and otherwise 
the law of the state in which the federal court is sitting). 
238 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. & Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
239 Id. at 496. 
240 The focus of the analysis in this section is on disputes internal to the 
United States.  But note that in cases with international elements, federal courts 
must equally apply state choice of law rules, which designate foreign law rather 
than the law of any U.S. state.  See Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 
3 (1975).  
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One important, but fundamentally uncertain, aspect of this 
decision is whether, like the Erie principle more generally,241 it 
should be extended beyond diversity cases to disputes before 
federal courts based on other heads of jurisdiction (such as 
bankruptcy or federal question jurisdiction).  The Supreme Court 
has declined to answer this question on several occasions,242 and 
some, but not all,243 Circuit Courts of Appeals have refused to 
extend Klaxon to non-diversity cases, instead developing federal 
choice of law rules for application in these cases,244 largely based 
on the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.245
This uncertainty is perhaps a reflection of the fact that the 
justification for the decision in Klaxon also remains somewhat 
contentious.  It was clearly intended (following the policy in Erie) 
to ensure that federal and state courts applied the same law, thus 
 
 
241 See supra text accompanying note 151 (discussing Erie’s scope over 
diversity cases and cases regarding federal law).  
242 See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement 
Workers of Am. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 705 n.8 (1966) (noting 
that the possible application of Klaxon in the case did not arise because all of the 
operative activities took place in the forum state); Richards v. United States, 369 
U.S. 1, 7 (1962) (“[W[e need not pause to consider the question whether the 
conflict of laws rule applied in suits where federal jurisdiction rests upon 
diversity of citizenship shall be extended to a case such as this, in which 
jurisdiction is based upon a federal statute.”). 
243 See, e.g., A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Int’l Banking Corp., 62 F.3d 1454 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (following Klaxon’s rule that the federal courts must apply the 
choice of law rules of the state in which the court sits); In re Payless Cashways, 
203 F.3d 1081, 1084 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that bankruptcy courts should apply 
the choice of law rules of the state in which the court is located).  
244 See, e.g., Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(considering that when federal jurisdiction arises from a federal statute, such as 
the applicable statute on foreign banking transactions, federal common law choice 
of law rules apply); Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 861 F.2d 1291 n.14 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (noting that federal common law should be used to resolve conflicts of 
law in cases where federal jurisdiction is not based on diversity); Corporacion 
Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786, 795 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(“[In] a federal question case . . . it is appropriate that we apply a federal common 
law choice of law rule.”).  See generally Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: 
Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and Same-Sex Marriage, 86 B.U. L. REV. 881 (2006) 
(reviewing the use, effects, and limitations of federal common law in bankruptcy 
cases); Little, supra note 151 (highlighting the development of hybrid law between 
federal and state choice of law conflicts, specifically in bankruptcy courts and 
foreign affairs).  
245 See, e.g., Huynh, 465 F.3d at 997 (outlining the federal common law’s 
adherence to the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws to apply statutes of 
limitations); see also infra text accompanying notes 272–75 (discussing further the 
influence of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws).  
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limiting forum shopping between the different court systems.  
State choice of law rules had to be applied, “[o]therwise the 
accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal 
administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts 
sitting side by side.”246  This rested on the assumption that “[a]ny 
other ruling would do violence to the principle of uniformity 
within a state upon which the Tompkins decision is based.”247  But 
this uniformity could equally have been achieved by recognizing 
federal choice of law rules as being invested with constitutional 
authority, which would preempt state choice of law.248  As 
discussed above, modern federal common law has this binding 
character—it is applicable in both federal and state courts, and 
overrides inconsistent state law.249  In the case of choice of law 
rules, the authority to develop federal common law could have 
been derived either from specific provisions of the Constitution, 
such as the Full Faith and Credit clause, or more generally from the 
structure of the federal system, in particular the horizontal, 
perhaps territorial, division of state powers.250  There is even some 
suggestion of support for this in the Rules of Decision Act itself, 
which requires that in federal courts “[t]he laws of the several 
states . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision . . . in cases where 
they apply,”251
Federal common choice of law rules, in diversity cases and 
otherwise, would have an additional benefit—not only limiting 
 perhaps (although certainly not unambiguously) 
suggesting a federal standard for determining the applicability of 
state law. 
 
246 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).  
247 Id. 
248 See Friendly, supra note 130, at 402 (supporting the decision in Erie, but 
arguing that “the constitutional basis of Erie does not apply to choice of law 
issues”).  
249 See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of judge-
made federal common law on the states).  
250 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 117 (tracing the development of federal common 
law and arguing that a number of traditional rules are actually based upon and 
required by the Constitution); Hill (Part II), supra note 150, at 565 (suggesting that 
Congress or the Supreme Court could establish a uniform conflict of laws code 
under the full faith and credit clause or similar power derived from the 
Constitution); see also David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 
YALE L.J. 1584 (2009) (arguing that Congress is well suited to form conflict of laws 
rules under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution).  There is, of 
course, a further ‘separation of powers’ issue about whether any such recognition 
should be made by the Supreme Court or by Congress. 
251 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2010) (emphasis added). 
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forum shopping between federal and state courts, but also forum 
shopping between state courts themselves.  As discussed 
previously, however, this second form of forum shopping has 
often been viewed much more favorably in U.S. jurisprudence than 
the first, as part of the positive process of regulatory 
competition.252  Some have even advocated forum shopping 
because of the benefit it offers to plaintiffs “as agents of law 
enforcement,”253 although many would not see choice of law rules 
as the appropriate mechanism to achieve such substantive policy 
goals.254
Another aspect of the explanation for the decision in Klaxon 
must be the status of choice of law rules when it arose, so soon 
after the adoption of the First Restatement on the Conflict of Laws 
in 1934.
 
255  Allocating authority over conflict of laws rules to the 
states would not have seemed likely to lead to widespread 
diversity, in light of their common history under the influence of 
federal common law and the Constitution, and the harmonizing 
influence of the Restatement.  In Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,256 for 
example, Justice Brandeis (who later wrote the opinion in Erie) 
held for the Court that Texas could not apply its law or public 
policy to “abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders having 
no relation to anything done or to be done within them”257 without 
violating Due Process, suggesting at least the potential for the 
development of significant constitutional constraints on state 
choice of law.  As noted above, Alaska Packers Association v. 
Industrial Accident Commission of California258
 
252 See supra Part 4.1. 
 appeared to begin 
253 Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 65 (1991). 
254 See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 237, at 14 (finding both conservative and 
liberal enforcement of forum-preferring choice of law rules problematic).  
255 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 117, at 120 (noting that the First Restatement 
gained popularity in courts soon after its adoption and minimized the practice of 
forum shopping). 
256 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).  
257 Id. at 410; see also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land 
Co., 292 U.S. 143, 150 (1934) (holding that a state may not, on grounds of policy, 
ignore a right which has lawfully vested elsewhere if the interest of the forum has 
but slight connection with the substance of the contract obligations, because it 
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment). 
258 Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532 
(1935); see supra note 230 and accompanying text (reviewing the court’s attempt in 
Alaska Packers to weigh each state’s interests against one another to determine 
which state’s law should rule).  
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developing a methodology to achieve this.  However, while there 
remains some role for the requirements of Full Faith and Credit 
and Due Process in limiting state choice of law rules, they have 
generally been interpreted to have only a narrow effect in modern 
U.S. conflict of laws.259  The existence of some constitutional 
constraints on choice of law does mean that it is more accurate to 
say that conflict of laws rules are an example of ‘hybrid’ rules 
made up of both federal and state influences, rather than purely a 
matter of state law.260
As part of the U.S. “conflict of laws revolution,” discussed 
further below, there has also been a significant (although not 
universal) rejection of the formalist and territorial rules adopted in 
  Nevertheless, there has been a clear shift 
away from the constitutional limits previously thought to constrain 
the conflict of laws. 
 
259 See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (holding that the full 
faith and credit clause and the due process clause are violated when the court 
disregards another state’s clearly recognized laws brought to the court’s 
attention); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (indicating that the 
full faith and credit clause and the due process clause are only violated when one 
state unfairly applies its laws or shows complete disregard for another state’s 
interests); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (discussing the decline of 
weighing states’ interests in determining whether application of a law violates the 
full faith and credit clause or the due process clause); see also Basedow, supra note 
44, at 2127 (noting that the full faith and credit clause and due process clause have 
had limited effect on modern conflict of laws since Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague); 
Engdahl, supra note 250 (discussing the historical development of the full faith 
and credit clause and Congress’ discretion in applying full faith and credit to 
sister-states legislation); Gottesman, supra note 237, at 20 (arguing that framers of 
the Constitution did not intend the full faith and credit clause to allow the 
Supreme Court to regulate conflict of laws decisions, but to ensure that states do 
not apply law that has no connection to a controversy); MILLS, supra note 12, at 
140; Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND. L.J. 271 
(1996) (observing that the due process clause and full faith and credit clause exert 
only a small influence over conflict of laws decisions). 
260 See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text (recognizing the Supreme 
Court’s sometime support of hybridization between state and federal laws).  For 
an argument that conflict of laws rules are also, more generally, a hybrid of 
international and domestic law, see MILLS, supra note 12, at 295.  Note that this is a 
different issue from the question of whether choice of law rules should be open to 
the application of hybrid law, rather than choosing discretely between different 
legal systems.  See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1155 (2007) (arguing that legal pluralism in a deterritorialized world requires 
the acceptance and management of hybridity); Little, supra note 151 (exploring 
hybrid lawmaking as an example of judicial restraint); Arthur Taylor Von 
Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and Significance 
in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV. 347 (1974) (looking 
favorably upon accommodating the views of all appropriate jurisdictions through 
legal blending rather than choice). 
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the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, and a rapid development 
of diverse techniques and approaches in choice of law.  The United 
States has been and continues to be a laboratory for conflict of laws 
experimentation.  Together, these developments have encouraged 
the eclectic diversity of state choice of law rules which 
characterizes the United States today261—many of which overtly or 
covertly favor the law of the forum (as discussed below).  This 
multiplicity is frequently the source of criticism—it is, perhaps, 
unclear whether the laboratory is producing useful science.262  In 
any case, it is arguably this development (together with the 
acceptance of broad and potentially overlapping grounds for state 
court jurisdiction),263
It is therefore understandable, but perhaps nevertheless still 
ironic, that just as the need for federal conflict of laws was at its 
greatest (with the additional need to coordinate conflicts between 
the diverse state rules of private law potentially applicable in 
different federal courts following Erie), federal control over conflict 
of laws was in fact (at least in diversity cases) largely curtailed.  
This problem is even obliquely acknowledged by the Supreme 
Court in Clearfield Trust, where the Court noted that “[t]he 
application of state law, even without the conflict of laws rules of the 
forum, would subject the rights and duties of the United States to 
exceptional uncertainty.”
 and not the allocation of regulatory authority 
over choice of law to the states per se, which gives the decision in 
Klaxon its adverse effects, potentially encouraging forum shopping 
between states in search of a more favorable applicable law. 
264
 
261 See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 
2009: Twenty-Third Annual Survey, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (2010) (reviewing the 
2009 results of an annual survey on which choice of law methods each jurisdiction 
implements and developments in U.S. courts). 
  The Court thus implicitly accepted 
262 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 119 (arguing that full deference should be 
paid to constitutional provisions, such as the full faith and credit clause, and 
Congress or the Supreme Court should create a uniform set of choice of law 
rules); Gottesman, supra note 237, at 11 (noting that most academics today 
disapprove of this disorganized approach); Ralph U. Whitten, Curing the 
Deficiencies of the Conflicts Revolution: A Proposal for National Legislation on Choice of 
Law, Jurisdiction, and Judgments, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 259 (2001) (reasoning that 
the only solution to modern conflict of laws problems is to preempt state laws 
with national, uniform legislation). 
263 See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 237 (arguing that the development of state 
conflict of laws resolutions and each state’s typical preference for forum law has 
led to waste and unfairness); MILLS, supra note 12, at 147. 
264 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (emphasis 
added). 
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that the multiplicity of state choice of law rules created by Klaxon 
has contributed to that uncertainty, and adds further justification 
for the development of federal substantive rules of law, under the 
subsidiarity analysis adopted as part of Clearfield Trust. 
Part of the explanation for the decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Klaxon may also lie in its conceptualization of the conflict 
of laws, which the Court held to be a means for states to pursue 
“local policies diverging from those of its neighbors.”265  Choice of 
law rules are here (problematically) conceived as serving the 
interests of a local conception of “justice” or “fairness,” as a matter 
of private law.266  A contrast may be drawn with the previous U.S. 
approach, and with the modern conception of the conflict of laws 
under the European Union, where the subject is viewed as serving 
a function of public constitutional ordering.  Such a ‘public law’ 
characterization clearly makes a justification of federalized 
regulation more persuasive—if conflict of laws rules are to serve a 
federal coordinating function, this is likely to be performed much 
more efficiently through federalized rules rather than ad hoc state 
regulation.  It also suggests the development of federal rules 
governing international conflict of laws disputes, by analogy with 
other areas of law in which the federal interest in governing 
foreign relations has been held to justify federal common law.267
If a private law perspective on the conflict of laws was indeed 
at least part of the basis for the decision in Klaxon, then it requires 
fresh consideration.  It is no longer accurate to describe rules of 
conflict of laws in the United States as being concerned with 
“private law.”  As noted above, in the middle of the twentieth 
century conflict of laws in many U.S. states underwent a dramatic 
revolution in perspective and techniques.  This ironically drew on 
the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Alaska Packers Association v. 
  
Such a consideration is, however, neglected if the conflicts of laws 
rules applicable to a private dispute are themselves viewed as 
purely private in character. 
 
265 Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. & Mfg., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
266 See MILLS, supra note 12, ch. 1. 
267 See sources cited supra note 179 (discussing the use of federal common law 
in cases implicating foreign relations).  But see supra note 240 (noting that when 
dealing with foreign law issues, courts must still apply the conflict of laws rules of 
the state in which the court sits). 
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Industrial Accident Commission of California268 that the federal 
reconciliation of conflicting state statutes should involve 
“appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction.”269  
Under various new approaches, choice of law rules were taken to 
be concerned with competing state policies, interests and statutes, 
and judges were invited to evaluate these before determining 
which state law should apply.  Of course, choice of law rules have 
always been concerned, at least to some extent, with an analysis of 
state interests.  That analysis has traditionally taken place in the 
design of the rules, whether carried out by the courts or a 
legislator—thus, the traditional lex loci delicti rule in tort reflects an 
analysis that the law of the place of a tort is most ‘interested’ in 
governing the tort.  Interest analysis approaches in the United 
States defer this decision to the judge in each individual case, 
rather than adopting a general rule.  Many state courts in the 
United States (and thus, under Klaxon, federal courts), when faced 
with conflict of laws disputes, thus frequently adopt approaches 
which very much emphasize public, governmental, regulatory 
interests, or at least combine consideration of those elements with 
traditional choice of law rules.  To some extent this is shaped by 
constitutional Due Process concerns, examined above.270  It may, 
however, as analyzed above in respect of the European Union,271
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, adopted in 1969, 
requires consideration of both traditional territorial connecting 
factors (such as the place of performance of a contract, or the place 
of contracting),
 
also be viewed as reflecting the horizontal effect of subsidiarity, the 
determination that the governing law should be the law closest to 
those affected by the regulation.     
272
 
268 Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532 
(1935) (holding that not every statute of another state will override a conflicting 
statute of the forum state by virtue of the full faith and credit clause). 
 as well as consideration of “the relevant policies 
of the forum” and “the relevant policies of other interested 
269 Id. at 547. 
270 See supra note 257 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Brandeis’s 
opinion in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick regarding a state’s inability to abrogate rights of 
people beyond its borders over a conflict that has no connection to that state). 
271 See supra Part 3.3. 
272 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) (1968) (outlining the 
factors to be considered in choosing the law applicable to a contract in the absence 
of an effective choice by the parties). 
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states.”273  It has thus been criticized as “a hodgepodge of all 
theories”274 that added little by way of progressive development of 
the law.  Its apparent influence, including on the development of 
federal choice of law rules in non-diversity cases,275 may rather be 
readily attributable to its compatibility with a wide variety of 
approaches and outcomes.  Calls for a more effective Third 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws are occasionally made,276 but 
while there is some recognition of the advantages of reaching an 
agreement on a single approach, there seems to be little prospect of 
obtaining widespread agreement on which approach should be 
adopted, although new interdisciplinary scholarship offers the 
potential for fresh perspectives.277
Dramatic as the changes in choice of law technique have been, 
they have not had an impact in practice on the allocation of 
competence between federal and state levels, at least in diversity 
cases, despite continuing calls by scholars for a new federal 
common law of choice of law.
 
278  Even the Second Restatement and 
proposals for a putative Third Restatement arguably implicitly 
reinforce the idea that conflict of laws is within state and not 
federal competence—they reflect the technique of ‘bottom-up’ 
harmonization adopted in the context of private law in both the 
European Union and the United States.279
 
273 Id. § 6 (1967). 
  At least part of the 
274 Gottesman, supra note 237, at 8; see also Friedrich K. Juenger, General 
Course on Private International Law, 193 RECUEIL DES COURS 119, 220 (1985); Laycock, 
supra note 119, at 253 (“Trying to be all things to all people, [the Second 
Restatement] produced mush.”).  
275 See supra note 245 (discussing the influence of the Second Restatement on 
federal common law choice of law rules). 
276 See, e.g., Symposium, Preparing for the Next Century—A New Restatement of 
Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 399 (2000) (discussing the debate over a proposed Third 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws).  
277 See supra note 6 (discussing the recent growth in interdisciplinary 
scholarship in the United States relating to the conflict of laws). 
278 See, e.g., Daniel C.K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of International Law: 
Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 165, 169 
(1988) (arguing that a “federal common law rule” should “preempt state law” in a 
situation where “the use of state law to decide international choice of law issues” 
would result in a “compromise [of] significant federal interests”); Donald T. 
Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1715 (1992) 
(advocating for a recognition of the “inherently federal nature of choice-of-law 
questions”). 
279 See supra notes 77 and 191–92 and accompanying text.  But note also the 
role that the Second Restatement has played in developing federal choice of law 
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reason for this continuing subjection of choice of law to ideas of 
subsidiarity is that the prevailing conception of the conflict of laws 
as ‘public’ law in the United States is very different from the 
conception adopted in the European Union.  The evaluation of 
state interests required under U.S. approaches does not (usually) 
adopt a systemic perspective on the appropriate ordering of 
authority over private law between U.S. states.280  Rather, the 
courts of each state evaluate the competing interests of different 
state laws, and sometimes consider not only their applicability but 
their substantive desirability.  One product of this difference is that 
E.U. choice of law rules place much greater emphasis on systemic 
objectives of certainty and predictability than on achieving the 
ideal outcome for each individual case, the basis for much of the 
criticism of E.U. rules from lawyers in the United Kingdom.281
Another product of the highly flexible, policy-oriented U.S. 
approaches is that state courts are more likely to give effect to the 
policies adopted under their own law, an approach openly 




rules in non-diversity cases.  See Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992 
(9th Cir. 2006). 
 leaving choice of law 
rules as subservient to other state policies.  Where an interstate 
dispute arises, and proceedings are commenced in a state whose 
substantive law favors the plaintiff (as may frequently be the case, 
given the forum shopping opportunities afforded by the flexibility 
of jurisdictional rules), choice of law rules which favor forum law 
potentially institutionalize a type of “bias.”  This bias will not 
280 For counter-examples, see MILLS, supra note 12, at 217.  
281 See sources cited supra note 94 (collectively debating the necessity and 
methodology of European regulation of the conflict of laws). 
282 See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966) (discussing the evolution of “choice-influencing 
considerations,” including the advancement of the forum’s interests); see also 
Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883, 885 (2002) 
(critiquing existing approaches to choice of law, including those which exhibit 
forum preference, and arguing that choice of law rules should be economically 
based, because “the objective of a choice-of-law regime should be to provide a 
legal ordering that goes as far as possible toward maximizing global welfare”); 
Joseph William Singer, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Curtain: The Place of 
Better Law in a Third Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 659 (2000) (discussing the 
importance of substantive justice to conflict of laws cases and arguing for its 
explicit recognition in the Third Restatement); Weinberg, supra note 253 (favoring 
forum law over foreign law because plaintiffs often rely on universal principles 
embodied in local law, whereas defendants assert foreign law as an excuse or 
defense from liability for damaging conduct). 
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always be in favor of the local party—the plaintiff may commence 
proceedings in the defendant’s residence, and benefit from choice 
of law rules that select favorable substantive rules from that state.  
Nevertheless, in many situations it will be a defendant from 
outside the state who suffers at the hands of forum-biased state 
choice of law rules.  This suggests that the modern development of 
U.S. state choice of law rules may have subtly created the very 
conditions of discrimination that diversity jurisdiction originally 
sought to negate, and whose apparent redundancy inspired the 
abandonment of the goal of ‘neutrality’ under Erie and Klaxon.283
While the U.S. conflict of laws revolution has thus transformed 
choice of law from a subject concerned with private interests to a 
subject concerned with public interests, it has stopped short of 
giving strong weight to systemic, federal interests, although the 
development of federalized choice of law rules in non-diversity 
cases in some federal circuits suggests that this may be changing.  
The “unilateralism” of much modern U.S. conflict of laws 
scholarship, which views the subject as serving local interests and 
policies, remains strongly contrasted with the federal 
“multilateralism” of modern E.U. regulation, which has been 
emphasized by the shift in the function of the conflict of laws 




283 See supra Part 4.1.2 (discussing the policy and impact of Erie). 
  This remains 
an enduring consequence of the allocation of authority over 
conflict of laws rules to the states by the Supreme Court in Klaxon.  
Even though U.S. choice of law methodologies now frequently 
recognize public interests in a variety of ways, they have largely 
not discarded the basic characterization of conflict of laws as state 
law, concerned primarily with state policies. 
284 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 8; FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW 
AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 45–46 (Special ed. 2005) (claiming that historically, “there 
are only three basic choice-of-law methods:” substantive, unilateralist and 
multilateralist); Stanley E. Cox, Substantive, Multilateral and Unilateral Choice-of-Law 
Approaches, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 171 (2001) (examining the effects of substantive, 
multilateral, and unilateral “choice-of-law approaches” and offering suggestions 
for how each approach can help guide the drafters of a Third Restatement); 
Symeon C. Symeonides, American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 37 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1 (2001) (proposing six overlapping questions that may help 
to establish a choice of law framework that strikes the right balance between 
flexibility and certainty). 
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4.3. Too Little Subsidiarity, Too Late? 
In resurrecting a part of federal common law, the Supreme 
Court in Clearfield Trust reasoned (as noted above)285 that:  “The 
application of state law . . . would lead to great diversity in results 
by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws 
of the several states.  The desirability of a uniform rule is plain.”286
On its face, there seems to be no clearer justification for the 
harmonization of choice of law rules in the United States than the 
application of this test—an argument recognized by the Supreme 
Court itself in previous case law.
   
287  It has not, however, justified 
the adoption of federalized conflict of laws rules in practice.  It is 
difficult to resist the temptation to look back at the history of 
subsidiarity, private law, and choice of law in the United States as 
a missed opportunity,288
 
285 See supra Part 4.1.3. (discussing the impact of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United 
States). 
 perhaps even merely a case of bad timing.  
The need for subsidiarity came as a reaction to the centralization of 
private law effected by Swift v. Tyson and the “New Deal.”  It thus 
first emerged as a negative principle, limiting the scope of federal 
regulatory authority over private law (in Erie), before being 
counterbalanced by the emergence of its positive, centralizing 
function, justifying federalized regulation (in Clearfield Trust).  But 
this more balanced conception of subsidiarity emerged only after 
the conflict of laws had already been determined to be subject to 
distributed state regulation, under Klaxon.  If Klaxon had arisen 
after the Clearfield Trust test had been established, or even after the 
dramatic diversifying effects of the conflict of laws revolution were 
felt, there must at least be an argument that the Supreme Court, 
applying its own test, would have held that the special problems 
raised by the possibility of conflicting choice of law rules justified 
federalized regulation—a realization which is perhaps reflected in 
286 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). 
287 See Boseman v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196, 206 (1937) 
(concluding that Pennsylvania law governed a life insurance policy because the 
contract was made and delivered in Pennsylvania, the policy declared that 
Pennsylvania law governed, the petitioner accepted the terms of the policy, and 
the parties intended that “inequalities and confusion liable to result from 
applications of diverse state laws sh[ould] be avoided”). 
288 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 119, at 282 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. erred in “requir[ing] the federal 
court to follow state choice-of-law rules instead of the other way around”). 
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the development of federal choice of law rules in some federal 
circuits when dealing with non-diversity cases.289
Perhaps, however, this argument understates the significance 
of the historical private law conception, and modern unilateralist 
methodology, of U.S. conflict of laws.  The perspective of a judge 
or academic on these developments is no doubt determined, at 
least to some extent, by their basic conception of conflict of laws 
and of the federal system itself.  One writer may look at the present 
diversity of choice of law techniques in the United States and see a 
rich range of voices, a properly functioning federal market of legal 
ideas striving competitively for acceptance.  Another may see U.S. 
choice of law as a disordered and discordant cacophony, 
particularly when compared with the rising tide of harmonization 
in Europe.  Those with a more international perspective recognize 
that this may pose particular problems for the United States in 
negotiating and implementing international efforts to harmonize 
conflict of laws rules, given the ongoing dispute over federal 
power to implement treaties.
 
290
Perhaps, in the face of growing interstate litigation and forum 
shopping inefficiencies, pressure for harmonized federal regulation 
of substantive private law might provide the impetus for (judicial 
or Congressional) development of federal choice of law rules as a 
 
 
289 See sources cited supra note 244 (collectively noting the refusal of some 
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals to apply Klaxon to non-diversity cases, favoring 
instead federal choice of law rules).  
290 See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (holding that a state may 
apply its “default rules” because “[w]hile a treaty may constitute an international 
commitment, it is not binding domestic law unless Congress has enacted statutes 
implementing it or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘self-executing’ 
and is ratified on that basis”); Ronald A. Brand, The European Magnet and The U.S. 
Centrifuge: Ten Selected Private International Law Developments of 2008, 15 ILSA J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 367, 368 (2009) (proposing that the rise of the federal system in 
Europe as the “primary source[] of . . . private international law” and the 
simultaneous rise of the U.S. states in creating such law may “diminish the role of 
the United States and enhance the role of the European Community as global 
players in the development of private international law”); Symposium, Return to 
Missouri v. Holland: Federalism and International Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 921 (2008) 
(revisiting Missouri v. Holland in an effort to understand how “international law 
and federalism” have developed since the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in 1920); see also Julian G. Ku, The Crucial Role of the States and Private 
International Law Treaties:  A Model for Accommodating Globalization, 73 MO. L. REV. 
1063 (2008) (discussing the “central role” of state government to “the development 
and integration of private international law treaties into the United States legal 
system”).  This may be contrasted with the situation in the European Union.  See 
sources cited supra note 98. 
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more palatable alternative.291  This is an argument which has been 
(implicitly) recognized by the Supreme Court itself.292
Without a stronger recognition of the systemic dimension of 
the conflict of laws in the United States, it is difficult to see the 
potential for federalized regulation of choice of law to serve this 
important constitutional function being recognized.  Perhaps, 
however, this will be one of the products of the nascent 
interdisciplinarity being introduced into conflict of laws 
scholarship
  If such a 
development were to occur, it would provide a further striking 
parallel to the emergence of federalized conflict of laws rules in the 
European Union.  The reasoning here is clearly recognizable as 
equivalent to the analysis behind the emergence of E.U. conflict of 
laws—viewing choice of law not as subject to subsidiarity, but as 
its agent, coordinating and thus helping to preserve the diverse 
private law systems of the European Member States.  If U.S. state 
private law competence were to come under serious threat from 
federal regulation, federalized choice of law rules may be 
embraced as a compromise solution—an ordering of private state 
law which makes federal private law significantly more difficult to 
justify.  Thus, federal conflict of laws rules may act in aid of the 
requirements of subsidiarity and federal balancing. 
293—a law and economics approach, for example, might 
easily forego analysis of the efficiency of conflict of laws rules in 
individual cases, and instead examine their national systemic 
effects.  Such a change might lead U.S. scholars to embrace at least 
some of the federalist “theology”294
 
291 See Gottesman, supra note 237, at 32 (“[T]he framers of the Constitution 
would have been aghast at the notion that Congress could enact a tort law, but 
they plainly envisioned that Congress could referee the application of competing 
state tort laws in multistate contexts”). 
 of the European conflict of 
292 See supra note 163 and accompanying text (quoting Clearfield Trust: “The 
application of state law, even without the conflict of laws rules of the forum, would 
subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty.”)  
(emphasis added). 
293 See sources cited supra note 6 (illustrating an increasing interdisciplinary 
interest in the United States in the conflict of laws sphere).  
294 See Fentiman, supra note 94, at 2050–51 (noting that the European model of 
“federalized choice of law” does not necessarily require “absolute uniformity” 
and positing that such uniformity would be unlikely to result from a federalized 
American choice of law regime). 
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laws revolution, perhaps recalling Judge Calabresi’s observation 
that “[w]ise parents do not hesitate to learn from their children.”295
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In both the European Union and the United States, the question 
of the distribution of competence between federal and state levels 
of government over private law and the conflict of laws has been 
contentious.  Each federal system has experimented (and continues 
to experiment) with a range of competing regulatory strategies, 
including harmonization (“top-down” or “bottom-up”), 
hybridization, and the coordination of state private law diversity 
through federal conflict of laws rules. 
Put in a broader historical context, the trajectories of 
federalized private law in each system initially seem markedly 
different.  The days of general federal common law under Swift v. 
Tyson are well and truly in the past for the United States, since Erie 
rejected general federal court competence to develop private law.  
By contrast, a revolutionary European Civil Code appears to be at 
least possibly blooming (or looming) in the future for the European 
Union.  At present, however, the status of federal private law in the 
European Union and United States, as a limited and fragmented 
indirect consequence of other federal powers, is strikingly similar.  
In both the European Union and United States, early developments 
in the centralization of law were met by counter-movements which 
emphasized the importance of balancing the constitutional 
imperatives toward harmonization and unification with 
decentralizing principles.  These ideas have pointed toward the 
need for matters of substantive private law to be principally 
governed by subsidiary legal orders, as part of the balance of 
regulatory competence in the federal system.  However, each 
constitutional settlement also makes a fairly similar determination 
that, while competence over private law largely remains with the 
states, the boundaries of federal authority remain open to 
contestation.  The E.U. Treaties have expressly incorporated a 
principle of subsidiarity to govern this federal balancing.  In the 
United States, similar principles have been developed in the case 
law of the Supreme Court, in particular under Clearfield Trust and,  
at times, under the Commerce Clause, potentially offering a model 
 
295 United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., 
concurring). 
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from which the European Court of Justice might develop the 
justiciability of the subsidiarity principle.  In respect of both E.U. 
and U.S. private law, subsidiarity is partially ‘hard-wired’ as a 
matter of constitutional settlement, but also plays a significant role 
in the political and legal negotiation of shared powers, as a 
question of constitutional practice. 
Conflict of laws rules are, by contrast, treated dramatically 
differently in each system.  In the European Union, the conflict of 
laws, despite being left out of the original E.U. Treaties, has now 
been clearly embraced as a cornerstone of the federal constitutional 
framework.  A federalized conflict of laws is thus flourishing under 
the exercise of an authority expressly hard-wired into the 
constitutional treaties.  In the United States, choice of law was part 
of general federal common law, but now, although still a hybrid of 
federal constitutional constraints and state law, it falls 
predominantly under the diverse regulation of the different states.  
Federal judicial competence over choice of law was strictly 
curtailed under Klaxon—although perhaps there are signs of its re-
emergence in non-diversity cases. 
While there are innumerable factors at play, one key part of the 
explanation for this difference seems to be the characterization of 
the conflict of laws itself as a subject.  In the European Union, the 
conflict of laws is increasingly viewed as part of the public law 
infrastructure which orders the diversity of Member State laws, 
serving the needs of the internal market, while preserving Member 
State legal cultures.  Hence, federalized E.U. conflict of laws rules 
are viewed as satisfying the political and legal requirements of 
subsidiarity—they achieve systemic objectives which could not 
easily be met through national regulation.  In the United States, the 
conflict of laws has predominantly been viewed either as a matter 
of private law, which should be part of the diversity of state laws, 
or as a matter of the unilateral advancement of forum policies.  In 
either case, the failure to adopt a systemic perspective undermines 
the case for federalized regulation.  Without such a change in 
perspective, the policy arguments in favor of state regulation of 
choice of law, whether expressed as states’ rights or as the benefits 
of regulatory competition among conflict of laws rules, cannot 
easily be overcome. 
The transformation in the character of the conflict of laws in the 
European Union, from national to European law, and from private 
to public law, is every bit as radical as the U.S. conflict of laws 
revolution, but with the opposite effect.  In the European Union, 
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conflict of laws rules support subsidiarity, by ordering the diversity 
of Member State laws, diminishing the need for harmonized 
federal private law.  In the United States, the conflict of laws is 
predominantly viewed as subject to the centrifugal forces of 
subsidiarity, a matter where the diversity of state laws is inherently 
valued.  In the face of a perception of excessive legal centralization, 
federal conflict of laws rules have been increasingly embraced in 
the European Union as part of the solution, while in the United 
States they have been rejected as part of the problem.  This contrast 
is all the more striking when put in the context of the similarity in 
the general treatment of private law in each system, and the 
common recognition of the role of ideas of subsidiarity in striking a 
federal balance. 
While the world is no doubt “shrinking” under the influence of 
globalization, making international and interstate disputes (and 
thus conflict of laws issues) more frequent, when it comes to 
understanding the complex relationship between subsidiarity, 
private law and the conflict of laws, it seems the North Atlantic has 
never looked wider.  At the same time, however, it seems that the 
potential benefits of looking comparatively across it, in both 
directions, have never been greater. 
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